| Sigh ....
Member Since: Dec 2006 Location: Fort Washington, MD
Posts: 6,631
| Islam Without Camaflage Pt 1
a review of The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) Quote:
August 20, 2005
Islam Without Camouflage
By Andrew G. Bostom
Through the first six decades of the 20th century, a cadre of erudite Christian theologians and scholars wrote illuminating, unapologetic analyses of Islamic dogmas, practices, and history. These individuals, primarily Europeans, also included persons from the indigenous pre—Islamic communities, living with the major Muslim populations of Africa, the Levant, Asia Minor, the Indian subcontinent, and the Far East. Prominent among these distinguished scholars were Edward Sell, W. St. Clair Tisdall, W.H.T. Gairdner, D.S. Margoliouth, W.R. Gardner, Henri Lammens, Arthur Jeffery, Samuel Zwemer, Murray Titus, and Antoine Fattal. Their detailed, eloquent observations were refreshingly candid, and they often engaged in lively and illuminating debates with the Islamic apologists of their respective generations, both Muslim and non—Muslim alike.
Excerpts from insightful works by Gardner in 1912, (W.H.T.) Gairdner in 1919, and Fattal in 1958—addressing critical issues, such as jihad war, and dhimmitude, the plight of non—Muslims vanquished by jihad campaigns—illustrate this distinctive style of writing, which was devoid of the politically correct dithering typical of most contemporary analysis of these matters.
W.R. Gardner, who worked and studied in India, was a Christian theologian and scholar of the Koran and Sufism. He debunked at length apologetic 'reinterpretations' of jihad war written by Sheikh Muhammad Rida and Chiragh Ali, in particular, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Gardner assailed the disingenuous sophistry of the narrow 'etymological' arguments propounded by these Muslim apologists, and then turned their tacit acknowledgments against them—acknowledgments which validate, ironically, a millennium of both orthodox Islamic jurisprudence, and the bellicose history of jihad:
For the question of what jihad is cannot be settled by reference alone to the etymology of the word jihad. The Koran plainly teaches in many passages, notwithstanding the claims—put forward by Maulavi Chir�gh `Ali (cf. Sells 'The Faith of Islam,' pp. 411 ff.), the duty of fighting for the Faith or 'in the way of God,' by using the word q�tala, and El Zamakhshary [d.1144, the renowned Koranic commentator], commenting on ii. 186, 7, says, 'Fighting in the way of God is jihad for the glorifying of his word and the strengthening of the Religion.' And whatever may be the etymological meaning of the word jihad, there can be no gainsaying the fact that it is sometimes used in the Koran in the sense of warlike actions, a warfare for the sake of the Faith. And when one asks what the teaching of Mohammedanism is concerning jihad, the word is employed in this latter sense. [1]
There is undoubtedly a feeling, if not a belief, among many Westerners that a Moslem regards it as a duty binding on him in accordance with the literal command of the Koran, to kill any and every unbeliever whom he may meet when once jihad has been proclaimed. Sheikh Rid� acknowledges that this conception of the duty of a Moslem during jihad may have been in the past, and may even now be that which is common among the ignorant or less educated Moslems... among the more recent Moslem apologists, jihad is regarded as war in defence [sic] of Islam, but we have been forced to the conclusion that any war in which a non—Moslem power is the aggressor must inevitably be regarded by Moslems as involving on their part jihad. The point we have now to consider is, what is the teaching of Mohammedanism as to wars of aggression. Is a war for the extension of Islamic rule also jihad ? In considering this point, not much light is to be got from the writings of the more recent Moslem authors, such as those we have quoted. They simply deny that it is a principle of Islam that jihad may include wars of aggression. By denying this, however, they do not prove anything; and, in order to get light on this part of the question before us, we must look at the Koran itself through those explanations of it which up to the present time pass as authoritative. This does not, of course, mean that these explanations are necessarily correct. Maulavi Chir�gh 'Ali, for example, denies that they are correct. To quote his opinion as given in Sell's 'The of Faith of Islam,' p. 411, 'All fighting injunctions in the Koran are, in the first place, only for self—defence, and none of them has any reference to making war offen�sively. In the second place, they are transitory in their nature. The Mohammedan Common Law is wrong on this point where it allows unbelievers to be attacked without provocation.' We do not desire here to discuss this question as to whether the Common Law is right or wrong, that is, whether orthodox Mohammedanism is a fine representation of the spirit and teaching of the Koran, or whether a better and truer representation of the conception of Mohammed and of his teachings might not have been given in a system of doctrine, developed from the point of view of Maulavi Chir�gh `Ali and such Moslems as he...Let us quote his words again: 'The Mohammedan Common Law is wrong on this point when it allows unbelievers to be attacked without provocation.' We take then as proved, the statement that Mohammedan Common Law allows unbelievers to be attacked without provocation... (emphasis added) [2]
W.H.T. Gairdner (d. 1928, in Cairo), was a gifted Arabic linguist and scholar of (the Sufi) Al—Ghazali's works, who lived for three decades in Cairo, where he also served as a Protestant Canon. In 1919, he wrote an essay responding to a mendacious 'birthday tribute' panegyric of Muhammad written collaboratively by Muslims and non—Muslims. A particularly trenchant segment of Gairdner's rebuttal discussed the slaughter of the vanquished Medinan Jewish tribe, the Banu Qurayza—a massacre which became an important motif in jihad war jurisprudence. [3] Relying exclusively upon Muslim sources, Gairdner highlighted without equivocation the pivotal role that Muhammad himself played in orchestrating the overall events:
The umpire who gave the fatal decision (Sa'ad) was extravagantly praised by Muhammad. Yet his action was wholly and admittedly due to his lust for personal vengeance on a tribe which had occasioned him a painful wound. In the agony of its treatment he cried out— 'O God, let not my soul go forth ere thou has cooled my eye from the Bani Quraiza' [Banu Qurayza]. This was the arbiter to whose word the fate of that tribe was given over. His sentiments were well—known to Muhammad, who appointed him. It is perfectly clear from that that their slaughter had been decreed. What makes it clearer still is the assertion of another biographer that Muhammad had refused to treat with the Bani Quraiza at all until they had 'come down to receive the judgment of the Apostle of God'. Accordingly 'they came down'; in other words put themselves in his power. And only then was the arbitration of Sa'ad proposed and accepted— but not accepted until it had been forced on him by Muhammad; for Sa'ad first declined and tried to make Muhammad take the responsibility, but was told 'qad amarak Allahu takhuma fihim' 'Allah has commanded you to give sentence in their case'. From every point of view therefore the evidence is simply crushing that Muhammad was the ultimate author of this massacre. [4]
Four decades later (in 1958), Antoine Fattal, a Lebanese Maronite Professor of Law, whose Le Statut Legal de Musulmans en Pays' d'Islam remains the benchmark analysis of non—Muslims (especially Christians and Jews) living under the Shari'a (i.e., Muslim Law), offered these perspectives on the living legacy of jihad and dhimmitude:
Dhimma or dhimmi status...is one of the results of the jihad or holy war. Connected with the notion of jihad is the distinction between dar al—harb (territory or 'house' of war) and dar al—islam (house of Islam). The latter includes all territories subject to Moslem authority. It is in a state of perpetual war with the dar al—harb. The inhabitants of the dar al—harb are harbis, who are not answerable to the Islamic authority and whose persons and goods are mubah, that is, at the mercy of Believers. However, when Moslems are in a subordinate state, they can negotiate a truce with the Harbis lasting no more than ten years, which they are obliged to revoke unilaterally as soon as they regain the upper hand, following the example of the Prophet after Hudaibiyya...[5]
...Even today, the study of the jihad is part of the curriculum of all the Islamic institutes. In the universities of Al—Azhar, Nagaf (Najaf), and Zaitoune, students are still taught that the holy war [jihad] is a binding prescriptive decree, pronounced against the Infidels, which will only be revoked with the end of the world... If he [the dhimmi] is tolerated, it is for reasons of a spiritual nature, since there is always the hope that he might be converted; or of a material nature, since he bears almost the whole tax burden. He has his place in society, but he is constantly reminded of his inferiority...In no way is the dhimmi the equal of the Muslim. He is marked out for social inequality and belongs to a despised caste; unequal in regard to individual rights; unequal in the Law Courts as his evidence is not admitted by any Muslim tribunal and for the same crime his punishment is greater than that imposed on Muslims...No social relationship, no fellowship is possible between Muslims and dhimmis... [6] | |
LinkBack URL
About LinkBacks
Digg this Thread!
Add Thread to del.icio.us
Bookmark in Technorati
Furl this Thread!
Add Thread to Facebook