D.C. Vs. Heller

[AK-74me]

Here is a good piece.


Concurring Opinions

Decision will be coming soon.

[chernmax]

I totally support Maryland as a CCW state. Hope the decision is favorable...

[RadioPatrol]

2. What Purposes Does the Right Protect? Privately owned firearms can potentially serve a variety of legitimate purposes. Some of these are civic purposes: deterring tyranny; protecting against invasion or internal disorder; promoting military readiness through individual practice with firearms. Others are private, personal purposes: self-defense against criminal violence; hunting; participating in the shooting sports. Assuming that the Court recognizes an individual Second Amendment right to arms, will it interpret that right in a way that stresses protection for the private purposes of citizen arms — as urged by the provocative amicus brief of Professor Nelson Lund? Or will it emphasize the civic purposes of citizen arms — as it seemed to do in the 1939 Miller decision? Or will it (correctly, in my view) embrace both kinds of purposes, as do many state constitutional decisions? The answer to this question will greatly influence the success of future Second Amendment challenges to restrictive gun legislation. ...

that is why the libs hate guns so much, we can defend ourselves against their Socialist Policies, by shooting there dumb azz

only the police have the job to defend you ....

[RadioPatrol]

3. Whither Miller? In the same vein, it will be fascinating to see how the Heller Court handles the 69-year-old opinion in U.S. v. Miller. Miller is compatible with an individual right to arms that stresses the civic purposes of arms ownership, and the concept of the citizen militia and the “ordinary military equipment” pertaining to it. Many members of the Court are clearly uneasy at the prospect of a strong interpretation of Miller, which one might boil down crudely into the formula: “machine guns for the people!”.

[wintersprings]

“machine guns for the people!”.

what, and then only drug dealers in a Dem run city would have them...Hint..they do

[ImnoMensa]

This is the big one. Its win or disarm.

[AK-74me]

Looks like it is getting pushed back again to Wed.

It'll be unteresting to see if Miller gets the axe. That ruling regulated the transfer of some firearms, but did not ban them outright like the FOPA did. I can live with the regulation, but the banning has to go.

[FredFlash]

Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse For His Judicial Activism

In the excerpt below, from the U. S. Supreme Court's opinion in the case of D. C. v. Heller, authored by Justice Scalia, the notorious judicial activist announces his intention to follow a rule of constitutional construction which dictates that the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense of their normal and ordinary use by ordinary citizens of the founding generation.

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood
by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731
(1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824).
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation...

Scalia is an incompetent activist. The Constitution wasn't made with the lawmakers understanding that it would be interpreted according to the normal and ordinary use of words by ordinary citizens of the founding generation.

John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, knew that there were well established common law rules of interpretation and that they applied to the U. S. Constitution.

The question now before us renders it necessary to pay particular attention to that part of the second section which extends the judicial power "to controversies between a State and citizens of another State." It is contended that this ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies excepting those in which a State may be plaintiff. The ordinary rules for construction will easily decide whether those words are to be understood in that limited sense.

--John Jay in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)