Hey Larry - here's that tiny bit of good news ...

that I was talking about with regard to oil (and a little bit of commentary that's not likely to be well received :lol:).

CFTC Looks Ready for Limits - WSJ.com

I'll wait to see the details of this rule before forming an opinion on its propriety. As with most things, the devil can be in the details. It will be very interesting to see how they intend to distinguish 'real' positions, hedge positions, and speculative positions - particularly the latter two - and how those different position 'types' will be treated differently. For practical purposes, hedge positions are 'real' positions, but for mechanistic purposes, they often behave and are effectuated like speculative positions. Anything that interferes with the actual market participants' ability to use the hedging mechanism is likely to cause significant problems.

That said, I fear that the effect of speculation on markets remains largely misunderstood by most (mechanistically, systemically, and notionally), and that lack of understanding often leads to oversimplified notions of its effect, and knee jerk reactions to those notions. In reality, its effects are much more nuanced.

Thinking of it in an abstract sense, the pricing mechanism of commodity markets plays out on two different levels of battle fields. The first level merely determines which battle field, on the other level, the pricing mechanism plays out on, and to what extent. The simplest way to think of the direct effect of speculation in commodities markets, and the way that best represents reality, is that it shifts the focus of the pricing mechanism away from current (mostly measurable and knowable) market conditions and toward future (largely speculative and unknowable) market conditions. It makes the important battle field the one on which the future supply/demand situation is considered, as opposed to the one on which the current supply/demand situation is considered.

Speculation, in and of itself, doesn't cause price inflation or deflation - it merely changes what factors are important to the pricing mechanism, and which ultimately cause price inflation or deflation. Under some circumstances, that means the former, and under some circumstances that means the latter. The more speculative money that is in a market, relative to 'real' money, the more the future matters. And, the more the future matters, the more volatile and variable the pricing mechanism is, because it depends more on perception and what is possible, as opposed to what is actual and known.

So, reducing the potential for speculation can reduce the potential for unwarranted price spikes (and drops), but it can also reduce the potential for warranted (and needed) price spikes (and drops). In some commodity markets - ones where the resource is systemically and irreplaceably important, and where its supply can't be quickly increased, nor its demand quickly decreased - speculative forces are very important to our long-term security. Something has to force us collectively to keep an eye on the future, even though most of us as individuals don't have an immediate incentive to do so. That's what speculation does. That is its net and certain effect. Now, it's no doubt true that, when trying to figure out what the future market conditions will be, we often get it very wrong. Thus, the market's pricing is very wrong for periods of time, and it has to correct (usually over correct). But, that's not the direct fault of the speculative dynamic, it is the fault of our erroneous consensus predictions and estimations about the future.

Speculative money doesn't fundamentally care that prices inflate or deflate - it would just like to see one or the other. More importantly though, it wants to be right, or rather, it wants to have the markets believe that it is right, about which one it will be. Regardless of how much speculative pressure is in a given market, the relative amount of power in the hands of those who necessarily wish to drive down prices (real users) and those who necessarily wish to drive up prices (real producers) remains the same. Mechanistically, speculation does not have any net effect in terms of increasing the pressure in either direction. That's just not how the market functions. It merely shifts the pricing battle to a different playing field. The same players are still on the field fighting to drive prices down, they just might not have as much ammunition to fight with (since the battle field is focusing more on future possibilities and less on current conditions). But, those players still have to agree to any price inflation, and they only do so if they feel they have to. It is still the perception of how much we will use, and how much we will produce, that ultimately dictates pricing - and that is what those players must consider when deciding to either give in to higher prices, or stand their ground and force prices down. If we want to keep prices down, we need to take actions to affect that perception.

If we go too far in removing speculation's ability to force us to pay attention to the future, we will wake up one day and find ourselves in a dire situation with regard to energy supplies. Yes, pervasive speculation is part of what drove prices way up last year - but it had a 'partner in crime' that none of us wants to own up to. And blaming speculation, so that we can ignore and deny the more culpable piece of the equation, is short-sighted and intellectually lazy, and it might have disastrous long term ramifications. Speculation isn't inherently evil, it's just playing its (important) role in the situation, as all of us are. I'm not against some regulation with regard to it, but we have to be very deliberate and surgical in what we do - we can't just rush in, in an irrational, emotional uproar, and start slashing with a meat cleaver, just to satiate the visceral need to do something about that evil activity. We need to be honest with ourselves about the role we all played in the massive energy price inflation, understand the dynamics involved in the situation, and only then take measured actions to make the system function more stably.


QUESTION: What happens to speculators that are betting on price inflation, when it comes time to close contracts, if the 'real' users aren't buying what they're selling (i.e. they aren't buying the story that oil prices have to keep going up because real supply shortages are around the corner)? Well, it ain't pretty. To make money betting on price inflation, they NEED those users to buy what they are selling - and those users decide whether or not they buy it based on the conditions that they observe in society (e.g. 'Is it likely that we'll be ramping up drilling activity anytime soon?', 'How quickly are we moving away from oil use in areas where it makes sense to?', 'Do consumers turn the heat in their homes down a little or drive fewer miles when fuel prices spike a dollar a gallon?', 'At what price level does it make fiscal sense for companies to make huge capital investments toward future oil production from sources that are more expensive to get at?', 'Do governments care more about selling their 'green' agendas than they do the realities of the global energy supply situation?')
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
What about re-instituting Glass-Steagal? It seems to me that the closest we can come to THE smoking gun of our economic disasters of the last 8 years can be summarized in the repeal of Glass-Steagal.
 
What about re-instituting Glass-Steagal? It seems to me that the closest we can come to THE smoking gun of our economic disasters of the last 8 years can be summarized in the repeal of Glass-Steagal.

Help me understand the argument as to why it matters specifically with regard to speculation in commodity markets. So that I don't go off on a line of thinking that totally misses your point, I just want to make sure I'm having the same conversation you are.

Is the point that, the repeal of Glass-Steagall allowed supposed 'depository' institutions to make more speculative, risky investments with capital that they otherwise would have had to have kept in safer investments? Thus, there was a lot more capital available to funnel into commodity speculation, and thus a lot more speculative money in specific commodity positions (like oil), creating the problems and price inflation?
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
Help me understand the argument as to why it matters specifically with regard to speculation in commodity markets. So that I don't go off on a line of thinking that totally misses your point, I just want to make sure I'm having the same conversation you are.

Is the point that, the repeal of Glass-Steagall allowed supposed 'depository' institutions to make more speculative, risky investments with capital that they otherwise would have had to have kept in safer investments? Thus, there was a lot more capital available to funnel into commodity speculation, and thus a lot more speculative money in specific commodity positions (like oil), creating the problems and price inflation?

Correct me I have this wrong but, the repeal opened the door for far more pure speculation in oil by getting rid of the old limits and also set the stage for the mortgage derivative incest that went on by, again, loosening regs.
 
Correct me I have this wrong but, the repeal opened the door for far more pure speculation in oil by getting rid of the old limits and also set the stage for the mortgage derivative incest that went on by, again, loosening regs.

In a way it did, that's what I'm getting at. Basically, Glass-Steagall made banks decide whether they were commercial banks or investments banks - they weren't allowed to be both. If they were a commercial bank, they could take deposits and make loans, but they couldn't do a lot of other 'investment' type activities. They couldn't act as brokers, they couldn't underwrite security offerings, they couldn't underwrite insurance (though that restriction came from a different law, not the original GSA), they couldn't funnel their depositors money into certain kinds of investments. The GSA created a regulatory wall between various kinds of 'banking' activities. The rational behind it was to prevent banks from having a conflict between its own interests and those of its depositors, and to safeguard depositors' funds by preventing them from being used by banks to make 'riskier' investments. (Ironically, this same legislation created FDIC insurance, one effect of which was to increase the need for the GS restrictions - but that takes us down a sidetrack.)

So, its repeal didn't really lift restrictions on commodity speculation, but it did mean that a broader range of financial institutions could use that (and many other) investment vehicles. Some people thought that was dangerous and jeopardized depository funds, but a lot of people argued that it made them safer, because banks could now create a more diverse portfolio of assets.

As for me, I think the propriety of repealing the GSA is dependent on other factors. In the presence of certain conditions, the repeal was dangerous - but absent those conditions, it would have been the right thing to do. So, do you blame the repeal of GSA, or do you blame the failure to fix those other conditions? For instance, if you have a hole in your roof, then it makes sense to have a barrel in the middle of the living room (even though it blocks the view of the TV and creates a pool of stagnant water which might lead to the presence of mosquitoes) to catch the water running in. Now, let's say someone removed the barrel, and didn't do anything to fix the hole in the roof. When the floors get soaked, and the the sub-floor rots, and the house gets infested with mold, should we focus our blame on the removal of the barrel, or the failure to fix the hole in the roof? Yes, the removal of the barrel allowed certain problems to occur, but it was the fundamentally bad policy of not fixing the roof that really deserves the blame (imo).

It's an age old dilemma. Government puts in place bad policy (sometimes in the form of safeguards and backstops which protect people from the consequences of their own actions) which compromises the natural ways in which behavior is regulated. Then, it has to create artificial regulations in order to prevent the problems that might occur in the absence of the natural regulating forces. Those regulations inevitably create other problems which must, seemingly, be fixed by more artificial regulations. It's a tricky balance. How much should government insist on maintaining the original bad policies, and thus continually need even more bad policies to keep the system functioning somewhat? How much should the government just accept the fundamentally unsound nature of the original bad policies?

To your general point about the repeal of GS (and other regulations) setting the stage for a lot of the mess in the financial markets (the exotic investment instruments, the 'incest' as you so aptly describe it, the CDOs, the CDSs, etc.) - yes, it no doubt allowed a situation in which that mess could get out of control. But, in the bigger picture, that situation only existed to the degree that it did because we have a more general public policy of not allowing people to face the consequences of their actions - we mitigate the price of the risks they take, and we allow people to do things that they wouldn't naturally be able to do (I mean the big guys and the little guys). We encourage risky and irresponsible behavior, because we cover people's butts when it doesn't quite work out right - and people know this. There's nothing wrong with risky behavior, but in order to have the appropriate amount of it, the natural consequences of it have to remain unmitigated.

With specific regard to the housing mess, would the repeal of GS have mattered if we didn't have FM, FM, GM, the FHA and all sorts of other government incentives and subsidies encouraging risky behavior (e.g. buying a house that you don't have the money to pay for, and having to borrow huge sums of money to pay for it with no way to be certain that you'll have the ability to pay it back, or mortgage brokers selling mortgages to people that are likely to default, because they know that they can avoid the risk by immediately selling a bundle of them to some other fool who is more than willing to buy them because the government slapped a guarantee on them). Again, I'm not criticizing risky behavior, but natural forces will dictate how much of it occurs in the society. When the government creates artificial incentives for it, it creates more risky behavior than should take place, and problems inevitably result.

Back to the point of the thread, and your specific original question. No, I don't think re-instituting Glass-Steagall would have a profound effect on speculation in the energy markets. I think affecting that would require some other regulation, possibly what the CFTC is looking at doing. The reason is this, money is pretty fungible. Even if we went back to where certain financial institutions couldn't directly invest their capital in a particular investment vehicle (i.e. commodities futures), practically speaking, there would still be just as much capital available to flow into those vehicles. Other financial institutions could still directly invest in them. People make decisions on where to put capital based on assessments of how good an investment it is at a given pricing level. If 'commercial banks' are limited again to making business loans and buying Treasury securities, then their money flows to those things more, and the pricing of those things gets affected. So, those things become less attractive investments to other institutions, and their money flows away from them to other things - maybe commodity futures. As I said, money is fungible, and it is always moving around. Just because it is prohibited from flowing directly from A to D, doesn't mean that it doesn't flow from A to B to C to D.

I think the amount of money flowing into energy speculation is mostly determined by other factors. Don't get me wrong, the repeal of GS has had a large effect on a lot of things, but I don't see it having a large specific effect here.

One last thing, a lot of people point to 1999 as the singular moment of GS repeal, but the truth is more complicated. The Act had been being effectively repealed since the 60's, and in significant ways by the Fed since the 80's. The GLBA of 1999 did represent a significant, final dismantling of the GSA, but it wasn't like a light switch turning the whole thing off in an instant.
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
I think the amount of money flowing into energy speculation is mostly determined by other factors. Don't get me wrong, the repeal of GS has had a large effect on a lot of things, but I don't see it having a large specific effect here.

Wow. Good stuff.

I'm gonna swallow this in bites over the next couple of days. This is the one bite that matters most to me, my neighbor and the economy as a whole; oil and gas.

In my view, GS repeal beget the housing problem and that beget the energy speculation because of all the money that fled housing and stocks. The big boys are simply looking for a store of value for their money.

I NEVER fault people for doing what they should be doing to serve their customers. This is where government is supposed to accept that these people are actively trying to find ways to win and the feds are supposed to make sure wars don't get lost just to win a battle or two.

Bush acted out of fear with TARP and he sat by out of fear over oil. He had a general welfare obligation to run all that money OUT of oil and he didn't do it. He chose the wrong battle to skip there and he chose the wrong battle to win with TARP.

I mean, the man came to office and in April of 2001 warned of the impending Fanny inspired disaster. And did nothing about it.

I don't know chapter and verse but, when something significant gets changed, GS, and then the next several years sprout huge problems, no one has to connect every last dot. :lol:

Or do we? :jameo:
 
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