Sneakers
Just sneakin' around....
But you are available. If you get a call while you're in the middle of replacing a water heater, you may not respond timely, which an employer may not appreciate.
Vax Mandate Lawsuits
- Thread starter GURPS
- Start date
but there are also many who realize their job does not need to be done between "9 - 5" so they are able spend time with the family and still get the "required" hours in - and employers are accommodating that
jrt_ms1995
Well-Known Member
This I understand completely. I started my career as a CP-901 compile operator. I learned quickly that I wouldn't be "working" as I had been bagging groceries and stocking shelves. We had down time and my manager encouraged us to use our time wisely to do homework and study. We were paid baby sitters.
I've seen financial people that actually bitched about having to work around crunch time. They never took into account all those other times that they did absolutely nothing for weeks on end. It's great work, if you can get it.
There's definitely bloat in government. My bitching isn't going to change a thing.
New Zealand High Court Invalidates Vaccine Mandate
A reversal of prior positions by that court, primarily because the evidence proved the ineffectiveness of the vaccines.
A reversal of prior positions by that court, primarily because the evidence proved the ineffectiveness of the vaccines.
Fifth Circuit Affirms Injunction Against Navy Vaccine Mandate
Good decision. Important language on jab-or-job being irreparable injury.
For purposes of this litigation, Plaintiffs also filed declarations, confirming their religious beliefs and emphasizing that they do not object to undertaking COVID-19 mitigation measures such as masking, social distancing, and regular testing. and their experiences during the accommodation-request process.
The declarations also describe their experiences during the religious accommodation process. Various commanders told several Plaintiffs that they risked losing their special warfare device, the SEAL Trident, if they requested a religious accommodation. Many were also declared “medically disqualified,” or “non-deployable,” simply as a result of submitting their requests. Many Plaintiffs have also become ineligible for travel, transfer to other posts including trainings, and advancement in leadership simply because they are unvaccinated and have requested religious accommodations. For example, U.S. Navy SEAL 13 was removed from his leadership position, setting him back at least two years in progressing to the next rank. And U.S. Navy Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewman 1 was denied training and told by a commander that “the Navy does not want to spend additional money training someone it is going to lose.” Plaintiffs suggest that if the Navy discharges them and seeks recoupment of their training and education costs, those expenses could exceed one million dollars each.
Plaintiffs claim their accommodation requests are futile because denial is a predetermined outcome. U.S. Navy SEAL 2’s chain of command advised him that “all religious accommodation requests will be denied,” because “senior leadership . . . has no patience or tolerance for service members who refuse COVID-19 vaccination for religious reasons and want them out of the SEAL community,” and that “even if a legal challenge is somehow successful, the senior leadership of Naval Special Warfare will remove [his] special warfare designation.” U.S. Navy SEAL 5 averred that “[n]umerous comments from [his] chain of command indicate[d] . . . that there [would] be a blanket denial of all religious accommodation requests regarding COVID-19 vaccination.” US Navy SEAL 8 averred that his “chain of command . . . made it clear that [his] request [would] not be approved and . . . provided [him] with information on how to prepared for separation from the U.S. Navy.” U.S. Navy SEAL 11 declared that during a chief’s meeting, his command master chief told him that “anyone not receiving the COVID-19 vaccine is an ‘acceptable loss’ to the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community” and the “legal department used language such as ‘when they get denied,’ not ‘if they get denied.’”
II. Discussion
“Before addressing the merits, we must be sure that this is a justiciable case or controversy under Article III.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). If it is not, our inquiry will end. If it is, then we must consider whether Defendants have satisfied the four factors required to grant a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987)). This dispute is justiciable. But Defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of a stay.
Congress rendered justiciable Plaintiffs’ claims under RFRA, which applies to every “branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1). RFRA, in turn, sets the standards binding every department of the United States to recognize and accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs. It undoubtedly “applies in the military context.” United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2212 (2017). This makes sense because service members “experience increased needs for religion as the result of being uprooted from their home environments, transported often thousands of miles to territories entirely strange to them, and confronted there with new stresses that would not otherwise have been encountered if they had remained at home.” Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 227 (2nd Cir. 1985). Federal courts are therefore empowered to adjudicate RFRA’s application to these Plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding RFRA’s broad scope, the district court below, as well as other courts, have believed themselves bound by a judicial abstention doctrine created in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). In that case, the court sought to identify situations in which federal courts, faced with claims implicating internal military affairs, must withhold adjudication in favor of military decision-making. Mindes abstention is rooted in the federal common law principle of “comity.” Mindes, 453 F.2d at 199. But it is likely that, following RFRA’s enactment, abstention based on the Mindes test is no longer permissible.8 RFRA “operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws[.]” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). It would not be a stretch to conclude that RFRA must also displace a judge-created abstention doctrine. “[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981).
In an abundance of caution and deferring to circuit precedent, however, we consider whether Mindes abstention ought to apply here. Mindes requires courts to “examine the substance of [a plaintiff’s] allegation [implicating internal military affairs] in light of the policy reasons behind nonreview of military matters.”9 453 F.2d at 201. In doing so, courts must first determine whether “[t]he plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights or that the military violated statutes or its own regulations[.]” Meister v. Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 233 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201). Courts must next assess whether the plaintiff has exhausted all available intra-service corrective measures. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201. If the plaintiff satisfies both criteria, then the court considers a series of factors, which amount to a synopsis of pre-Mendes case law that had adjudicated claims arising from military service: (1) “[t]he nature and strength of the plaintiff’s challenge to the military determination[;]” (2) “[t]he potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused[;]” (3) “[t]he type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function[;]” and (4) “[t]he extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved.” Id. at 201-02.
Plaintiffs satisfy the first threshold Mendes inquiry because they allege constitutional violations of the First Amendment and RFRA, which “secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment[.]” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
With respect to the second inquiry, this court has held that “n the military context, the exhaustion requirement promotes the efficient operation of the military’s judicial and administrative systems, allowing the military an opportunity to fully exercise its own expertise and discretion prior to any civilian court review.” Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 637- 38 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1974)). Nonetheless, exhaustion is unnecessary if, inter alia, the administrative remedy is futile and plaintiffs raise substantial constitutional claims. Id. at 638 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs are exempted from exhausting their administrative remedies for both of these reasons. 10 The Navy has not accommodated any religious request to abstain from any vaccination in seven years, and to date it has denied all religiously based claims for exemption from COVID-19 vaccination. It is true that futility is not a function of the likely ultimate success of administrative exhaustion. But evidence, recited previously and not meaningfully challenged here, suggests that the Navy has effectively stacked the deck against even those exemptions supported by Plaintiffs’ immediate commanding officers and military chaplains. This is sufficiently probative of futility.11 Further, as explained more fully below, Plaintiffs raise substantial, legally clear-cut questions under RFRA. Courts are specifically equipped to address RFRA claims and, by the same token, the issues are less suitable for administrative adjudication. Plaintiffs have thus satisfied the threshold criteria required by Mindes. But a final justiciability determination depends on considering the four additional Mindes points.
[clip]
Defendants have not demonstrated “paramount interests” that justify vaccinating these 35 Plaintiffs against COVID-19 in violation of their religious beliefs. They insist that “given the small units and remote locations in which special-operations forces typically operate, military commanders have determined that unvaccinated service members are at significantly higher risk of becoming severely ill from COVID-19 and are therefore medically unqualified to deploy.” But “[r]outine [Naval Special Warfare] mission risks include everything from gunshot wounds, blast injuries, parachute accidents, dive injuries, aircraft emergencies, and vehicle rollovers to animal bites, swimming or diving in polluted waters, and breathing toxic chemical fumes.” There is no evidence that the Navy has evacuated anyone from such missions due to COVID-19 since it instituted the vaccine mandate, but Plaintiffs engage in life-threatening actions that may create risks of equal or greater magnitude than the virus.
More specifically, multiple Plaintiffs successfully deployed overseas before and after the vaccine became available, and one even received a Joint Service Commendation Medal for “safely navigating restricted movement and distancing requirements” while deployed in South Korea between January and June 2020.21 Plaintiffs also trained other SEALs preparing for deployments at various points during the pandemic while remaining unvaccinated.
The Navy’s alleged compelling interest is further undermined by other salient facts. It has granted temporary medical exemptions to 17 Special Warfare members, yet no reason is given for differentiating those service members from Plaintiffs. That renders the vaccine requirements “underinclusive.” Navy Seals 1–26, 2022 WL 34443, at *10. And “underinclusiveness . . . is often regarded as a telltale sign that the government’s interest in enacting a liberty-restraining pronouncement is not in fact ‘compelling.’ ” BST Holdings, 17 F.4th at 616 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542-46, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2231-34(1993)); See also Holt, 574 U.S. at 367, 135 S. Ct. at 865 (RLUIPA context) (a policy was substantially underinclusive where a prison “denied petitioner’s request to grow a 1/2-inch beard [for religious reasons] [while permitting] prisoners with a dermatological condition to grow 1/4- inch beards.”). Moreover, in none of the letters denying religious accommodations to these Plaintiffs has the Navy articulated Plaintiff-specific reasons for its decisions.22 Further evidencing that there is a pattern of disregard for RFRA rights rather than individualized consideration of Plaintiffs’ requests, the Navy admits it has not granted a single religious accommodation. Yet surely, had the Navy been conscientiously adhering to RFRA, it could have adopted least restrictive means to accommodate religious objections against forced vaccinations, for instance, to benefit personnel working from desks, warehouses, or remote locations.
well fuk they might get the Flu as well
Good decision. Important language on jab-or-job being irreparable injury.
For purposes of this litigation, Plaintiffs also filed declarations, confirming their religious beliefs and emphasizing that they do not object to undertaking COVID-19 mitigation measures such as masking, social distancing, and regular testing. and their experiences during the accommodation-request process.
The declarations also describe their experiences during the religious accommodation process. Various commanders told several Plaintiffs that they risked losing their special warfare device, the SEAL Trident, if they requested a religious accommodation. Many were also declared “medically disqualified,” or “non-deployable,” simply as a result of submitting their requests. Many Plaintiffs have also become ineligible for travel, transfer to other posts including trainings, and advancement in leadership simply because they are unvaccinated and have requested religious accommodations. For example, U.S. Navy SEAL 13 was removed from his leadership position, setting him back at least two years in progressing to the next rank. And U.S. Navy Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewman 1 was denied training and told by a commander that “the Navy does not want to spend additional money training someone it is going to lose.” Plaintiffs suggest that if the Navy discharges them and seeks recoupment of their training and education costs, those expenses could exceed one million dollars each.
Plaintiffs claim their accommodation requests are futile because denial is a predetermined outcome. U.S. Navy SEAL 2’s chain of command advised him that “all religious accommodation requests will be denied,” because “senior leadership . . . has no patience or tolerance for service members who refuse COVID-19 vaccination for religious reasons and want them out of the SEAL community,” and that “even if a legal challenge is somehow successful, the senior leadership of Naval Special Warfare will remove [his] special warfare designation.” U.S. Navy SEAL 5 averred that “[n]umerous comments from [his] chain of command indicate[d] . . . that there [would] be a blanket denial of all religious accommodation requests regarding COVID-19 vaccination.” US Navy SEAL 8 averred that his “chain of command . . . made it clear that [his] request [would] not be approved and . . . provided [him] with information on how to prepared for separation from the U.S. Navy.” U.S. Navy SEAL 11 declared that during a chief’s meeting, his command master chief told him that “anyone not receiving the COVID-19 vaccine is an ‘acceptable loss’ to the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community” and the “legal department used language such as ‘when they get denied,’ not ‘if they get denied.’”
II. Discussion
“Before addressing the merits, we must be sure that this is a justiciable case or controversy under Article III.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). If it is not, our inquiry will end. If it is, then we must consider whether Defendants have satisfied the four factors required to grant a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987)). This dispute is justiciable. But Defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of a stay.
Congress rendered justiciable Plaintiffs’ claims under RFRA, which applies to every “branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1). RFRA, in turn, sets the standards binding every department of the United States to recognize and accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs. It undoubtedly “applies in the military context.” United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2212 (2017). This makes sense because service members “experience increased needs for religion as the result of being uprooted from their home environments, transported often thousands of miles to territories entirely strange to them, and confronted there with new stresses that would not otherwise have been encountered if they had remained at home.” Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 227 (2nd Cir. 1985). Federal courts are therefore empowered to adjudicate RFRA’s application to these Plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding RFRA’s broad scope, the district court below, as well as other courts, have believed themselves bound by a judicial abstention doctrine created in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). In that case, the court sought to identify situations in which federal courts, faced with claims implicating internal military affairs, must withhold adjudication in favor of military decision-making. Mindes abstention is rooted in the federal common law principle of “comity.” Mindes, 453 F.2d at 199. But it is likely that, following RFRA’s enactment, abstention based on the Mindes test is no longer permissible.8 RFRA “operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws[.]” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). It would not be a stretch to conclude that RFRA must also displace a judge-created abstention doctrine. “[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1791 (1981).
In an abundance of caution and deferring to circuit precedent, however, we consider whether Mindes abstention ought to apply here. Mindes requires courts to “examine the substance of [a plaintiff’s] allegation [implicating internal military affairs] in light of the policy reasons behind nonreview of military matters.”9 453 F.2d at 201. In doing so, courts must first determine whether “[t]he plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights or that the military violated statutes or its own regulations[.]” Meister v. Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 233 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201). Courts must next assess whether the plaintiff has exhausted all available intra-service corrective measures. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201. If the plaintiff satisfies both criteria, then the court considers a series of factors, which amount to a synopsis of pre-Mendes case law that had adjudicated claims arising from military service: (1) “[t]he nature and strength of the plaintiff’s challenge to the military determination[;]” (2) “[t]he potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused[;]” (3) “[t]he type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function[;]” and (4) “[t]he extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved.” Id. at 201-02.
Plaintiffs satisfy the first threshold Mendes inquiry because they allege constitutional violations of the First Amendment and RFRA, which “secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment[.]” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
With respect to the second inquiry, this court has held that “n the military context, the exhaustion requirement promotes the efficient operation of the military’s judicial and administrative systems, allowing the military an opportunity to fully exercise its own expertise and discretion prior to any civilian court review.” Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 637- 38 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1974)). Nonetheless, exhaustion is unnecessary if, inter alia, the administrative remedy is futile and plaintiffs raise substantial constitutional claims. Id. at 638 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs are exempted from exhausting their administrative remedies for both of these reasons. 10 The Navy has not accommodated any religious request to abstain from any vaccination in seven years, and to date it has denied all religiously based claims for exemption from COVID-19 vaccination. It is true that futility is not a function of the likely ultimate success of administrative exhaustion. But evidence, recited previously and not meaningfully challenged here, suggests that the Navy has effectively stacked the deck against even those exemptions supported by Plaintiffs’ immediate commanding officers and military chaplains. This is sufficiently probative of futility.11 Further, as explained more fully below, Plaintiffs raise substantial, legally clear-cut questions under RFRA. Courts are specifically equipped to address RFRA claims and, by the same token, the issues are less suitable for administrative adjudication. Plaintiffs have thus satisfied the threshold criteria required by Mindes. But a final justiciability determination depends on considering the four additional Mindes points.
[clip]
Defendants have not demonstrated “paramount interests” that justify vaccinating these 35 Plaintiffs against COVID-19 in violation of their religious beliefs. They insist that “given the small units and remote locations in which special-operations forces typically operate, military commanders have determined that unvaccinated service members are at significantly higher risk of becoming severely ill from COVID-19 and are therefore medically unqualified to deploy.” But “[r]outine [Naval Special Warfare] mission risks include everything from gunshot wounds, blast injuries, parachute accidents, dive injuries, aircraft emergencies, and vehicle rollovers to animal bites, swimming or diving in polluted waters, and breathing toxic chemical fumes.” There is no evidence that the Navy has evacuated anyone from such missions due to COVID-19 since it instituted the vaccine mandate, but Plaintiffs engage in life-threatening actions that may create risks of equal or greater magnitude than the virus.
More specifically, multiple Plaintiffs successfully deployed overseas before and after the vaccine became available, and one even received a Joint Service Commendation Medal for “safely navigating restricted movement and distancing requirements” while deployed in South Korea between January and June 2020.21 Plaintiffs also trained other SEALs preparing for deployments at various points during the pandemic while remaining unvaccinated.
The Navy’s alleged compelling interest is further undermined by other salient facts. It has granted temporary medical exemptions to 17 Special Warfare members, yet no reason is given for differentiating those service members from Plaintiffs. That renders the vaccine requirements “underinclusive.” Navy Seals 1–26, 2022 WL 34443, at *10. And “underinclusiveness . . . is often regarded as a telltale sign that the government’s interest in enacting a liberty-restraining pronouncement is not in fact ‘compelling.’ ” BST Holdings, 17 F.4th at 616 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542-46, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2231-34(1993)); See also Holt, 574 U.S. at 367, 135 S. Ct. at 865 (RLUIPA context) (a policy was substantially underinclusive where a prison “denied petitioner’s request to grow a 1/2-inch beard [for religious reasons] [while permitting] prisoners with a dermatological condition to grow 1/4- inch beards.”). Moreover, in none of the letters denying religious accommodations to these Plaintiffs has the Navy articulated Plaintiff-specific reasons for its decisions.22 Further evidencing that there is a pattern of disregard for RFRA rights rather than individualized consideration of Plaintiffs’ requests, the Navy admits it has not granted a single religious accommodation. Yet surely, had the Navy been conscientiously adhering to RFRA, it could have adopted least restrictive means to accommodate religious objections against forced vaccinations, for instance, to benefit personnel working from desks, warehouses, or remote locations.
well fuk they might get the Flu as well
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Asked my friend in NZ if she's seen that.
If true, could save her family's business.
SCOTUS Navy Seal Dispute
As usual, Gorsuch's dissent is more persuasive than Kavanaugh's concurrence.
Navy_Seal_1-26_v._Biden_SCOTUS_Opinion.pdf
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.
By rubberstamping the Government’s request for what it calls a “partial stay,” the Court does a great injustice to the 35 respondents—Navy Seals and others in the Naval Special Warfare community—who have volunteered to undertake demanding and hazardous duties to defend our country. These individuals appear to have been treated shabbily by the Navy, and the Court brushes all that aside. I would not do so, and I therefore dissent.
I
In August 2021, the Secretary of the Navy made COVID– 19 vaccination mandatory and threatened severe consequences, including dishonorable discharge and confinement, for anyone who refused.1 Later Navy directives told service members that they could apply for religious exemptions, see Electronic Case Filing in U. S. Navy Seals 1–26 v. Biden, No. 4:21–cv–01236 (ND Tex., Jan. 3, 2022) (ECF), Doc. 44–1, p. 40 (Trident Order #12), but this program, as
1 See Decl. of W. Lescher in No. 4:21–cv–01236 (ND Tex.), ECF Doc. 87, p. 10 (explaining that the Navy’s vaccination policy was that refusing to be vaccinated would constitute the refusal to obey “a lawful order under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” which is punishable by dishonorable discharge and confinement for two years).
described by the District Court, was largely “theater” designed to result in the denial of almost all requests. U. S. Navy Seals 1–26 v. Biden, ___ F. Supp. 3d___ (ND Tex. 2022), App. to Application for Partial Stay 31a (App.). The exemption procedure that the Navy set up included no fewer than 50 steps, and during the first 35 steps, none of the various officials who processed requests gave any consideration to their merit. Decl. of A. Stephens, Exh. 1, ECF Doc. 62, at 10–26. Instead, a form letter rejecting each request was prepared and sent to seven offices for review. App. 40a.2 A package of rejection letters was then assembled, together with a memo asking the vice admiral who served as a deputy chief of naval operations to sign the rejection letters. Ibid. Only at step 35 was someone in this chain told to read the exemption requests, but it appears that this individual was not given an opportunity to recommend that a request be granted. See ECF Doc. 62, at 7. Instead, this person’s sole task was to record pertinent information on a spreadsheet and send the package on to the vice admiral. Id., at 7–8.
Given the nature of this procedure, the results it produced are not surprising. Although more than 4,000 exemption requests had been submitted by February 15, 2022, not a single one had been approved when the complaint in this case was filed. See Application for Partial Stay 9, and n. 3 (Application) (citing ECF Doc. 129, at 16, n. 2 (Feb. 23, 2022)).
Respondents are among the many recipients of form rejection letters, and according to their declarations and testimony, some of them were told outright that pressing for a
2 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded based on the record that the Navy did not have a template for approving an exemption. See U. S. Navy Seals v. Biden, 27 F. 4th 336, ___ (CA5 2022) (per curiam), App. 6a; id., at 40a. In the Reply filed in this Court, the Solicitor General claims that there was an approval template, Reply Brief 12, n. 6, but no such document been supplied to this Court.
religious exemption would end their naval careers. A respondent identified as Navy Seal 2 stated that a superior officer advised him that “‘all religious accommodation requests will be denied’” because “‘senior leadership . . . has no patience or tolerance for service members who refuse COVID–19 vaccination for religious reasons and want them out of the SEAL community.’” U. S. Navy Seals v. Biden, 27 F. 4th 336, ___ (CA5 2022) (per curiam), App. 9a. This officer allegedly added that “‘even if a legal challenge is somehow successful, the senior leadership of Naval Special Warfare will remove [his] special warfare designation.’” Ibid. According to Navy Seal 5, he was told that “‘there [would] be a blanket denial of all religious accommodation requests regarding COVID–19 vaccination.’” Ibid. Navy Seal 8 declared that his “‘chain of command . . . made it clear that [his] request [would] not be approved and . . . provided [him] with information on how to prepare for separation from the U. S. Navy.’” Ibid. Navy Seal 11 stated that a command master chief told him that “‘anyone not receiving the COVID–19 vaccine is an “acceptable loss” to the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community.’” Ibid.
Forced to choose between violating their religious beliefs and the punishment that the Navy threatened, respondents brought this suit, claiming that the Navy’s denial of their exemption requests violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. See Complaint in ECF Doc. 1. The District Court found that these claims were likely to succeed, and it issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Navy from taking adverse actions against respondents due to their unvaccinated status. App. 56a. But the court made clear that its order did not require the Navy “to make any particular personnel assignments” and left “[a]ll strategic decisions . . . in the hands of the Navy.” Id., at 60a
The Government appealed and asked the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction, but the Fifth Circuit refused and issued a detailed opinion. 27 F. 4th 336
The Government then applied to this Court for what it characterizes as a “partial stay,” and the Court now issues a stay that uses precisely the language that the Government proposed. As I will explain, the Court’s order essentially gives the Navy carte blanche to warehouse respondents for the duration of the appellate process, which may take years. There is no justification for this unexplained and potentially career-ending disposition.
In order to obtain a stay, the Government must show, among other things, that it is likely to succeed in defeating respondents’ RFRA and free exercise claims, Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U. S. 770, 776 (1987), and it cannot make that showing.
Under the clear terms of RFRA, all components of the Federal Government are forbidden to burden a person’s exercise of religion unless the Government can demonstrate that the burden represents the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(b); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352, 357 (2015). The Government does not claim that Article II imperatives absolve the Navy’s chain of command from complying with RFRA, and it concedes that the statute applies to the military. Application 28 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 726–727 (2014)). Indeed, even the form disapproval letter for religious accommodation requests in the District Court record explains that RFRA applies to the Navy, and it is the Navy’s position that “only those interests of the highest order can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” ECF Doc. 62, at 27–28.
Here, it is not disputed that compliance with the vaccination requirement would impose a substantial burden on respondents’ free exercise of religion. Therefore, the two remaining questions are (1) whether the Navy’s mandatory vaccination program furthers compelling interests and (2) whether the denial of respondents’ exemptions represents the least restrictive means of furthering such interests.
As to the first question, I agree that the Navy has a compelling interest in preventing COVID–19 infection from impairing its ability to carry out its vital responsibilities, as well as a compelling interest in minimizing any serious health risk to Navy personnel. But the Navy’s summary rejection of respondents’ requests for religious exemptions was by no means the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. This is so for at least two reasons
First, all the evidence available at this stage suggests that the Navy gave no real consideration to respondents’ requests, and the Navy had no compelling need to proceed in that fashion. I cannot believe that this Court would tolerate such treatment in other contexts. Suppose, for example, that a federal agency processed employee complaints about discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or disability using a 50-step process in which rejection was presumed until the very last step, and suppose that the record showed that this procedure nearly always resulted in the denial of a claim. We would be outraged—and rightfully so. Why, then, is the Court willing to brush aside what appears to have occurred here?
Second, even if we ignore what the Navy did and accept the justification for the denials that Justice Department lawyers later provided in court, the relief that the Court now awards goes well beyond anything that can possibly be regarded as the least restrictive means of further compelling Navy interests. Focusing primarily on the Seals, the Government stresses certain characteristics of Seal missions, including small unit size, the frequent need to work at very close quarters, and the remote and often inaccessible locations in which such missions are carried out. Due to those characteristics, the Government argues, there is a heightened danger that the COVID–19 virus will spread, as well as a special need to minimize the risk that a mission will be compromised by a sick team member who is unable to perform assigned tasks with maximum effectiveness.
In order to win at trial, it would not be enough for the Government to posit that sending an unvaccinated Seal on such a mission might produce such consequences. A court could not simply defer to the Navy’s opinion, and mere “conjecture” or “speculation” would not be enough. See Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 13–15); Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 14). The Government would bear the burden of showing that mandatory vaccination is the least restrictive means of furthering the interest it asserts in light of the present nature of the pandemic, what is known about the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of the vaccines, prevalent practices, and the physical characteristics of Navy Seals and others in the Special Warfare community.
Whether the Government will be able to make the requisite showing remains to be seen, but for the purposes of considering interim relief that is sought in an emergency application, I am willing to accept the Navy’s need to refrain from sending unvaccinated Seals on the types of missions the Government has described. But participating in such missions is not the only thing that respondents do, and the relief that the Government sought and that the Court now awards goes much further. Using the terminology selected by the Government, the Court stays the preliminary injunction with respect to decisions about “deployment,” “assignment,” and “other operational decisions.”
The Government has not told us what these terms mean, but without any contrary guidance, we must assume that they will be interpreted in accordance with the definitions in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary).3 And as defined in that dictionary, the terms seemingly allow the Navy to do just about anything it wants short of punishing respondents and drumming them out of the service.
“Deployment” is defined as “[t]he movement of forces into and out of an operational area,”4 and an “operational area” seems to mean any “geographic are[a]” where the Navy might carry out “a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.”5 Thus, sending a respondent somewhere for training or administrative purposes may constitute a deployment.
The term “assignment” appears to include detailing an individual to perform any duties on something more than a temporary basis.6 And an “operational decision” apparently can include the carrying out of any “strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.”7
3 See DOD Dictionary (Nov. 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
4 Id., at 62.
5 Id., at 159.
6 The DOD Dictionary does not define “assignment,” but the term “assign” is given this complex definition: “
7 The specific term “operational decision” is not defined, but the definition of “operation” includes “the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.” Id., at 159.
pushing paper or reading manuals for the duration of the appellate process. It is squarely within the judicial power of Article III to assess whether the Government has shown that it has a compelling interest in obtaining this breadth of equitable relief pending appeal. The Government has not done so.
I would not rubberstamp the Government’s proposed language. While I am not sure that the Navy is entitled to any relief at this stage, I am also wary, as was the District Court, about judicial interference with sensitive military decision making. Granting a substantial measure of deference to the Navy, I would limit the order to the selection of the Special Warfare service members who are sent on missions where there is a special need to minimize the risk that the illness of a member due to COVID–19 might jeopardize the success of the mission or the safety of the team members. This, I believe, was the aim of the District Court, and respondents themselves understand the preliminary injunction that way. See Response in Opposition 1 (stating that the injunction “does not require the Navy to deploy any of the thirty-five plaintiffs” (footnote omitted)).
Respondents are also likely to prevail on their claims under the Free Exercise Clause. Under our case law, if the Federal Government or a State treats conduct engaged in for religious reasons less favorably than similar conduct engaged in for secular reasons, that treatment is unconstitutional unless the relevant jurisdiction can satisfy “strict scrutiny,” which is essentially the same as the standard imposed by RFRA. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879 (1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533 (1993).
That “[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds” is deferential does not “render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986). “This Court has never held . . . that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 304 (1983).
Here, the Navy treated service members who applied for medical exemptions more favorably than those who sought religious exemptions. For one thing, requests for medical exemptions were seriously considered, and quite a few were granted, at least on a temporary basis. Application 7–8; 27 F. 4th, at ___, App. 20a (“[T]he Navy acknowledges that it has granted hundreds of medical exemptions from the COVID–19 vaccine, at least 17 of which were temporary medical exemptions for those in Naval Special Warfare”). In addition, service personnel with medical exemptions are not restricted as severely as respondents will be under the Court’s order. App. 42a. Indeed, the District Court found that under Navy policy those participating in clinical trials and those with medical contraindications and allergies to vaccines remained deployable, unlike those seeking religious accommodations. Id., at 50a (citing ECF Doc. 17–2, at 66). The Navy has no interest in different treatment for accommodation requests that produce otherwise identical outcomes. I would therefore specify in the Court’s order that the Navy must provide equal treatment for all unvaccinated service members.
Today, the Court brushes aside respondents’ First Amendment and RFRA rights. But yesterday, the Court handed down another decision that illustrates the strong protection for religious liberty that is provided by the framework that applies under RFRA and strict scrutiny. The decision in question, Ramirez v. Collier, involved a convicted murderer awaiting execution and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq., which, among other things, essentially requires prisons to comply with the RFRA standard. Ramirez argued that his exercise of religion will be burdened unless Texas allows his pastor to lay hands on him and pray aloud while he is being executed. Ramirez was less than punctilious and consistent in requesting a religious accommodation, see Ramirez, 595 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5); id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8), but the Court’s decision forgave all that. Texas objected to Ramirez’s request on the ground that the pastor’s conduct might interfere with the execution, but the Court held that the State failed to discharge its burden to substantiate the likelihood of such harm. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
The contrast between our decision in Ramirez yesterday and the Court’s treatment of respondents today is striking. We properly went to some lengths to protect Ramirez’s rights because that is what the law demands. We should do no less for respondents.
As usual, Gorsuch's dissent is more persuasive than Kavanaugh's concurrence.
Navy_Seal_1-26_v._Biden_SCOTUS_Opinion.pdf
Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21A477 LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
ET AL. v. U. S. NAVY SEALS 1–26, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR A PARTIAL STAY
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21A477 LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
ET AL. v. U. S. NAVY SEALS 1–26, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR A PARTIAL STAY
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.
By rubberstamping the Government’s request for what it calls a “partial stay,” the Court does a great injustice to the 35 respondents—Navy Seals and others in the Naval Special Warfare community—who have volunteered to undertake demanding and hazardous duties to defend our country. These individuals appear to have been treated shabbily by the Navy, and the Court brushes all that aside. I would not do so, and I therefore dissent.
I
In August 2021, the Secretary of the Navy made COVID– 19 vaccination mandatory and threatened severe consequences, including dishonorable discharge and confinement, for anyone who refused.1 Later Navy directives told service members that they could apply for religious exemptions, see Electronic Case Filing in U. S. Navy Seals 1–26 v. Biden, No. 4:21–cv–01236 (ND Tex., Jan. 3, 2022) (ECF), Doc. 44–1, p. 40 (Trident Order #12), but this program, as
1 See Decl. of W. Lescher in No. 4:21–cv–01236 (ND Tex.), ECF Doc. 87, p. 10 (explaining that the Navy’s vaccination policy was that refusing to be vaccinated would constitute the refusal to obey “a lawful order under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” which is punishable by dishonorable discharge and confinement for two years).
described by the District Court, was largely “theater” designed to result in the denial of almost all requests. U. S. Navy Seals 1–26 v. Biden, ___ F. Supp. 3d___ (ND Tex. 2022), App. to Application for Partial Stay 31a (App.). The exemption procedure that the Navy set up included no fewer than 50 steps, and during the first 35 steps, none of the various officials who processed requests gave any consideration to their merit. Decl. of A. Stephens, Exh. 1, ECF Doc. 62, at 10–26. Instead, a form letter rejecting each request was prepared and sent to seven offices for review. App. 40a.2 A package of rejection letters was then assembled, together with a memo asking the vice admiral who served as a deputy chief of naval operations to sign the rejection letters. Ibid. Only at step 35 was someone in this chain told to read the exemption requests, but it appears that this individual was not given an opportunity to recommend that a request be granted. See ECF Doc. 62, at 7. Instead, this person’s sole task was to record pertinent information on a spreadsheet and send the package on to the vice admiral. Id., at 7–8.
Given the nature of this procedure, the results it produced are not surprising. Although more than 4,000 exemption requests had been submitted by February 15, 2022, not a single one had been approved when the complaint in this case was filed. See Application for Partial Stay 9, and n. 3 (Application) (citing ECF Doc. 129, at 16, n. 2 (Feb. 23, 2022)).
Respondents are among the many recipients of form rejection letters, and according to their declarations and testimony, some of them were told outright that pressing for a
2 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded based on the record that the Navy did not have a template for approving an exemption. See U. S. Navy Seals v. Biden, 27 F. 4th 336, ___ (CA5 2022) (per curiam), App. 6a; id., at 40a. In the Reply filed in this Court, the Solicitor General claims that there was an approval template, Reply Brief 12, n. 6, but no such document been supplied to this Court.
religious exemption would end their naval careers. A respondent identified as Navy Seal 2 stated that a superior officer advised him that “‘all religious accommodation requests will be denied’” because “‘senior leadership . . . has no patience or tolerance for service members who refuse COVID–19 vaccination for religious reasons and want them out of the SEAL community.’” U. S. Navy Seals v. Biden, 27 F. 4th 336, ___ (CA5 2022) (per curiam), App. 9a. This officer allegedly added that “‘even if a legal challenge is somehow successful, the senior leadership of Naval Special Warfare will remove [his] special warfare designation.’” Ibid. According to Navy Seal 5, he was told that “‘there [would] be a blanket denial of all religious accommodation requests regarding COVID–19 vaccination.’” Ibid. Navy Seal 8 declared that his “‘chain of command . . . made it clear that [his] request [would] not be approved and . . . provided [him] with information on how to prepare for separation from the U. S. Navy.’” Ibid. Navy Seal 11 stated that a command master chief told him that “‘anyone not receiving the COVID–19 vaccine is an “acceptable loss” to the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community.’” Ibid.
Forced to choose between violating their religious beliefs and the punishment that the Navy threatened, respondents brought this suit, claiming that the Navy’s denial of their exemption requests violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. See Complaint in ECF Doc. 1. The District Court found that these claims were likely to succeed, and it issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Navy from taking adverse actions against respondents due to their unvaccinated status. App. 56a. But the court made clear that its order did not require the Navy “to make any particular personnel assignments” and left “[a]ll strategic decisions . . . in the hands of the Navy.” Id., at 60a
The Government appealed and asked the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction, but the Fifth Circuit refused and issued a detailed opinion. 27 F. 4th 336
The Government then applied to this Court for what it characterizes as a “partial stay,” and the Court now issues a stay that uses precisely the language that the Government proposed. As I will explain, the Court’s order essentially gives the Navy carte blanche to warehouse respondents for the duration of the appellate process, which may take years. There is no justification for this unexplained and potentially career-ending disposition.
II
In order to obtain a stay, the Government must show, among other things, that it is likely to succeed in defeating respondents’ RFRA and free exercise claims, Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U. S. 770, 776 (1987), and it cannot make that showing.
A
Under the clear terms of RFRA, all components of the Federal Government are forbidden to burden a person’s exercise of religion unless the Government can demonstrate that the burden represents the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(b); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352, 357 (2015). The Government does not claim that Article II imperatives absolve the Navy’s chain of command from complying with RFRA, and it concedes that the statute applies to the military. Application 28 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 726–727 (2014)). Indeed, even the form disapproval letter for religious accommodation requests in the District Court record explains that RFRA applies to the Navy, and it is the Navy’s position that “only those interests of the highest order can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” ECF Doc. 62, at 27–28.
Here, it is not disputed that compliance with the vaccination requirement would impose a substantial burden on respondents’ free exercise of religion. Therefore, the two remaining questions are (1) whether the Navy’s mandatory vaccination program furthers compelling interests and (2) whether the denial of respondents’ exemptions represents the least restrictive means of furthering such interests.
As to the first question, I agree that the Navy has a compelling interest in preventing COVID–19 infection from impairing its ability to carry out its vital responsibilities, as well as a compelling interest in minimizing any serious health risk to Navy personnel. But the Navy’s summary rejection of respondents’ requests for religious exemptions was by no means the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. This is so for at least two reasons
First, all the evidence available at this stage suggests that the Navy gave no real consideration to respondents’ requests, and the Navy had no compelling need to proceed in that fashion. I cannot believe that this Court would tolerate such treatment in other contexts. Suppose, for example, that a federal agency processed employee complaints about discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or disability using a 50-step process in which rejection was presumed until the very last step, and suppose that the record showed that this procedure nearly always resulted in the denial of a claim. We would be outraged—and rightfully so. Why, then, is the Court willing to brush aside what appears to have occurred here?
Second, even if we ignore what the Navy did and accept the justification for the denials that Justice Department lawyers later provided in court, the relief that the Court now awards goes well beyond anything that can possibly be regarded as the least restrictive means of further compelling Navy interests. Focusing primarily on the Seals, the Government stresses certain characteristics of Seal missions, including small unit size, the frequent need to work at very close quarters, and the remote and often inaccessible locations in which such missions are carried out. Due to those characteristics, the Government argues, there is a heightened danger that the COVID–19 virus will spread, as well as a special need to minimize the risk that a mission will be compromised by a sick team member who is unable to perform assigned tasks with maximum effectiveness.
In order to win at trial, it would not be enough for the Government to posit that sending an unvaccinated Seal on such a mission might produce such consequences. A court could not simply defer to the Navy’s opinion, and mere “conjecture” or “speculation” would not be enough. See Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 13–15); Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 14). The Government would bear the burden of showing that mandatory vaccination is the least restrictive means of furthering the interest it asserts in light of the present nature of the pandemic, what is known about the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of the vaccines, prevalent practices, and the physical characteristics of Navy Seals and others in the Special Warfare community.
Whether the Government will be able to make the requisite showing remains to be seen, but for the purposes of considering interim relief that is sought in an emergency application, I am willing to accept the Navy’s need to refrain from sending unvaccinated Seals on the types of missions the Government has described. But participating in such missions is not the only thing that respondents do, and the relief that the Government sought and that the Court now awards goes much further. Using the terminology selected by the Government, the Court stays the preliminary injunction with respect to decisions about “deployment,” “assignment,” and “other operational decisions.”
The Government has not told us what these terms mean, but without any contrary guidance, we must assume that they will be interpreted in accordance with the definitions in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary).3 And as defined in that dictionary, the terms seemingly allow the Navy to do just about anything it wants short of punishing respondents and drumming them out of the service.
“Deployment” is defined as “[t]he movement of forces into and out of an operational area,”4 and an “operational area” seems to mean any “geographic are[a]” where the Navy might carry out “a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.”5 Thus, sending a respondent somewhere for training or administrative purposes may constitute a deployment.
The term “assignment” appears to include detailing an individual to perform any duties on something more than a temporary basis.6 And an “operational decision” apparently can include the carrying out of any “strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.”7
3 See DOD Dictionary (Nov. 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
4 Id., at 62.
5 Id., at 159.
6 The DOD Dictionary does not define “assignment,” but the term “assign” is given this complex definition: “
1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.
2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent.” Id., at 20.
7 The specific term “operational decision” is not defined, but the definition of “operation” includes “the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.” Id., at 159.
pushing paper or reading manuals for the duration of the appellate process. It is squarely within the judicial power of Article III to assess whether the Government has shown that it has a compelling interest in obtaining this breadth of equitable relief pending appeal. The Government has not done so.
I would not rubberstamp the Government’s proposed language. While I am not sure that the Navy is entitled to any relief at this stage, I am also wary, as was the District Court, about judicial interference with sensitive military decision making. Granting a substantial measure of deference to the Navy, I would limit the order to the selection of the Special Warfare service members who are sent on missions where there is a special need to minimize the risk that the illness of a member due to COVID–19 might jeopardize the success of the mission or the safety of the team members. This, I believe, was the aim of the District Court, and respondents themselves understand the preliminary injunction that way. See Response in Opposition 1 (stating that the injunction “does not require the Navy to deploy any of the thirty-five plaintiffs” (footnote omitted)).
B
Respondents are also likely to prevail on their claims under the Free Exercise Clause. Under our case law, if the Federal Government or a State treats conduct engaged in for religious reasons less favorably than similar conduct engaged in for secular reasons, that treatment is unconstitutional unless the relevant jurisdiction can satisfy “strict scrutiny,” which is essentially the same as the standard imposed by RFRA. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879 (1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533 (1993).
That “[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds” is deferential does not “render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986). “This Court has never held . . . that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 304 (1983).
Here, the Navy treated service members who applied for medical exemptions more favorably than those who sought religious exemptions. For one thing, requests for medical exemptions were seriously considered, and quite a few were granted, at least on a temporary basis. Application 7–8; 27 F. 4th, at ___, App. 20a (“[T]he Navy acknowledges that it has granted hundreds of medical exemptions from the COVID–19 vaccine, at least 17 of which were temporary medical exemptions for those in Naval Special Warfare”). In addition, service personnel with medical exemptions are not restricted as severely as respondents will be under the Court’s order. App. 42a. Indeed, the District Court found that under Navy policy those participating in clinical trials and those with medical contraindications and allergies to vaccines remained deployable, unlike those seeking religious accommodations. Id., at 50a (citing ECF Doc. 17–2, at 66). The Navy has no interest in different treatment for accommodation requests that produce otherwise identical outcomes. I would therefore specify in the Court’s order that the Navy must provide equal treatment for all unvaccinated service members.
III
Today, the Court brushes aside respondents’ First Amendment and RFRA rights. But yesterday, the Court handed down another decision that illustrates the strong protection for religious liberty that is provided by the framework that applies under RFRA and strict scrutiny. The decision in question, Ramirez v. Collier, involved a convicted murderer awaiting execution and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq., which, among other things, essentially requires prisons to comply with the RFRA standard. Ramirez argued that his exercise of religion will be burdened unless Texas allows his pastor to lay hands on him and pray aloud while he is being executed. Ramirez was less than punctilious and consistent in requesting a religious accommodation, see Ramirez, 595 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5); id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8), but the Court’s decision forgave all that. Texas objected to Ramirez’s request on the ground that the pastor’s conduct might interfere with the execution, but the Court held that the State failed to discharge its burden to substantiate the likelihood of such harm. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
The contrast between our decision in Ramirez yesterday and the Court’s treatment of respondents today is striking. We properly went to some lengths to protect Ramirez’s rights because that is what the law demands. We should do no less for respondents.
Just when you were ready to write New Zealand off as a lost cause, this happens. New Zealand media excitedly reported a story headlined, “New Zealand High Court ENDS Jacinda Ardern’s Vaccine Mandate: ‘It’s a Gross Violation of Human Rights’.”You don’t say.
The plaintiffs in the suit were New Zealand military members and police, who argued two provisions from the country’s Bill of Rights – the right to decline medical procedures and the right to religious freedom.
The Court found particularly significant that the jabs aren’t stopping infections. “Covid-19 clearly involves a threat to the continuity of police and NZDF services. That is because the Omicron variant in particular is so transmissible. But that threat exists for both vaccinated and unvaccinated staff. I am not satisfied that the order makes a material difference, including because of the expert evidence before the court on the effects of vaccination on Covid-19 including the Delta and Omicron variants,” the High Court wrote.
So. Keep fighting, Kiwis.
☕️ Coffee & Covid ☙ Saturday, April 9, 2022 ☙ DOCKED 🦠
Operation multiplier news; Disney stock takes a tumble; irony in the White House; New Zealand has a HUGE mandate win; the 5th Cir. overturns the mandate stay for federal workers; and more...
www.coffeeandcovid.com
TPD
the poor dad
Wow a court that actually acknowledges the vaccines don’t work. In New Zealand no less.
You don’t say.
The plaintiffs in the suit were New Zealand military members and police, who argued two provisions from the country’s Bill of Rights – the right to decline medical procedures and the right to religious freedom.
The Court found particularly significant that the jabs aren’t stopping infections. “Covid-19 clearly involves a threat to the continuity of police and NZDF services. That is because the Omicron variant in particular is so transmissible. But that threat exists for both vaccinated and unvaccinated staff. I am not satisfied that the order makes a material difference, including because of the expert evidence before the court on the effects of vaccination on Covid-19 including the Delta and Omicron variants,” the High Court wrote.
So. Keep fighting, Kiwis.
☕️ Coffee & Covid ☙ Saturday, April 9, 2022 ☙ DOCKED 🦠
Operation multiplier news; Disney stock takes a tumble; irony in the White House; New Zealand has a HUGE mandate win; the 5th Cir. overturns the mandate stay for federal workers; and more...
Kennedy & I Motion to Stop the Vaccine to Kids
See attached, with lots of medical information enclosed. Feel free to copy-and-paste, highlight, or use as you see fit, or is beneficial for you.
Motion_to_Stay_eFiled_4.15.22.pdf
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE, )
DEBORAH L. ELSE, an individual, and )
SACHA DIETRICH, an individual, ) )
Plaintiffs, ) )
v. ) )
FOOD and DRUG ADMINISTRATION, and )
JANET WOODCOCK, Acting Commissioner )
of Food and Drug Administration, ) )
Defendants. )
________________________________________ )
The FDA authorizes pharmaceutical companies to experiment on children without their consent. FDA’s EUA greenlights mandates of this experimental biologic on children to the enormous profit of the pharmaceutical companies, while simultaneously immunizing these same drug companies against any liability for any injuries their products cause.
With the granting of EUA status of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine for children as young as five years old, the FDA is conducting a dangerous and unprecedented experiment. Using its emergency powers, FDA authorized an experimental biologic for children, even though no COVID-19 health emergency exists for five year old children. This drug is neither safe nor effective and does not fit the traditional definition of “vaccine,” as was represented via this authorization. Despite knowledge that authorization would result in mandatory use without informed consent, Defendants engaged in neither the requisite scientific or citizen discourse, ignored citizen and scientific petitions alike, and skipped any notice-andcomment process altogether. The FDA misused its emergency powers to authorize an experimental mRNA vaccine for minor children despite serious safety concerns, inadequate testing, and outright misrepresentation of the biologic.
The FDA’s action poses irreparable and immediate injury to plaintiffs and places plaintiffs' minor children at imminent risk of harm. The FDA unlawfully and injuriously mischaracterizes any purported legal source of their power, falsely represents this body-altering experimental mRNA gene therapy to be injected into children, and impermissibly redefines the word “vaccine” itself. CHD as an institution suffers and its essential resources are diverted to address this danger. The FDA claims to be above the law, the citizenry, and even this court. This suit follows, and, due to the urgent threat posed, this motion made necessary thereby.
I. COVID-19 poses no emergency for children ages five through eleven
Defendants abused their authority under the emergency use authorization statute when it granted the EUA at issue because no “actual or potential emergency” exists for children ages five through eleven from COVID-19. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–3(a)(1).
Data on the risks posed from COVID-19 show that it is entirely unnecessary for children in this age group to be vaccinated. Death from COVID-19 in healthy children is statistically zero. A German study concluded that “children without comorbidities were found to be significantly less likely to suffer from a severe or fatal disease course,” with the lowest risk observed in healthy children aged five through eleven. 1 Within this group, the “ICU admission rate was 0.2 per 10,000 and case fatality could not be calculated, due to an absence of cases.”2 Similarly, a Johns Hopkins study monitoring 48,000 children diagnosed with COVID “found a mortality rate of zero among children without a pre-existing medical condition,”3 while a study published in Nature Medicine showed that children under 18 with no comorbidities have virtually no risk of death from COVID-19.4 Children also have low risk of severe symptoms and hospitalization, with COVID-19 “hospitalizations occurred at a rate of 10.8 per 100,000 children,” 5 and infected children often experience mild or asymptomatic disease. 6 Furthermore, epidemiological studies suggest that children do not significantly contribute to the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and that younger children may be less likely to transmit the virus. 7
The calculated risk from COVID-19 is realistically even lower, as this “emergency” was based on inaccurate death statistics. The CDC recently corrected its COVID-19 mortality data for children, which was “inflated” in a “coding logic error” in which non-COVID-19 related deaths were counted in the statistics reduced the total pediatric deaths from COVID-19 by nearly 24% (1,755 individuals to 1,356). 8 315 of those occurred in children ages five through eleven; this is equivalent to under 200 children per year in a population of approximately 28 million children aged five through eleven, which is under a 0.00000714 risk of death. Acknowledging this data, Florida became the first U.S. state to recommend against healthy children receiving this biologic, publishing guidance on March 8, 2022 that “healthy children from ages 5 to 17 may not benefit from receiving the currently available COVID-19 vaccine.”9
II. The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 “vaccine” confers no benefit to children
This biologic has proven to be monumentally less successful than the originally promised 90% effectiveness claimed by Pfizer-BioNTech. A comprehensive study of over 365,000 children ages five through eleven revealed that that biologic has an effectiveness of a mere 12%. 10 A study of hundreds of thousands of children in New York revealed that the COVID-19 vaccines offered “virtually no protection against infection, even within a month after full immunization.”11 What’s more, a Danish study found no statistically significant positive effect against Omicron infection was seen 30 days after vaccination, and after 90 days, it conferred a negative effectiveness, i.e. greater susceptibility to infection. 12 This trend is seen worldwide, with highly vaccinated populations demonstrating a higher COVID-19 infection rate.
The CDC excludes COVID-19 on their published list of “vaccine-preventable diseases” for a clear reason: this COVID-19 biologic fails to prevent COVID-19. At best, it reduces the incidence of hospitalization and death, of which children are at an incredibly low risk. As COVID-19 poses an infinitesimal risk to children ages five through eleven, and none to healthy children, and vaccination is ineffective at preventing infection or transmission, there is no medical necessity, or even justification, for pediatric COVID-19 vaccination.
[clip]
V. The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 biologic drug fails to meet the traditional definition of “vaccine”
The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 biologic does not fall under the traditional definition of “vaccine” and has thus been continuously misrepresented by Defendants, and ultimately the pharmaceutical companies, media, and American government. Pfizer-BioNTech’s experimental mRNA biologic is among the first of its kind, utilizing a brand-new delivery system and gene therapy technology. Unlike vaccines that have come before it, this biologic does not actually contain the virus, SARS-CoV-2, that causes the COVID-19 disease, but rather delivers mRNA sequences that infiltrate the body’s cells and yield the production of a spike protein that mimics the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. The mRNA component injected into the body utilizes the host cell’s own machinery to produce the spike protein. This is a different mechanism than that of traditional vaccines, such as inactivated, attenuated, subunit, or protein-based vaccines that do not penetrate human cells but utilize the actual virus to activate the body’s immune response
While not a “vaccine” under the traditional definition, this experimental injection does fall under the FDA Office of Cellular, Tissue, and Gene Therapies’ definition of “gene therapy products,” although the FDA failed to study and test it as such. Gene therapies have never been widely used in a general population and using them in this manner is still experimental.
VI. Defendants’ EUA absent a stay will result in discriminatory treatment towards unvaccinated children
The history of the FDA and its role in regulating medical products has led the public to trust the FDA’s actions without question. The very fact that the FDA authorized this product, instilled faith in its use and misled confidence in an experimental vaccine. Cultural and societal shifts that directly affect children have and will continue to occur as a result.
Defendants’ unlawful EUA has already triggered mandates and policies that segregate and endanger vaccinated and unvaccinated children. New Orleans became the first major school district in the United States to mandate that all children ages five and up receive a COVID-19 experimental injection.32 Furthermore, a bill proposed in California, SB 871, would require all children to receive a COVID-19 injection to attend childcare For school.33
Before the 5-11 EUA was even granted, there were calls from a Texas State Board of Education member to immediately add the COVID-19 vaccine to the list of public-school mandatory immunizations.34 In his request letter to the Department of State Health Services, he argued that this step should be taken “[n]ow that the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine has received full FDA approval.”35 The vaccine available under the 5-11 EUA is not the same as Pfizer’s licensed Comirnaty, which, according to the CDC, is not yet available to the public.36 This is an example of how school officials have been misled by FDA’s bait-and-switch as well as the eagerness to mandate this biologic for young children.
Even more alarming are reports of hospitals refusing to perform organ transplants for patients who have not received a COVID-19 vaccine.37 The Cleveland Clinic, the University of Colorado Hospital, and Brigham and Women’s Hospital have all engaged in this type of abhorrent discrimination. Just recently, a North Texas teenager was denied a kidney transplant due to his vaccination status.38 This discriminatory treatment has shockingly even applied to young children. In December 2021, a five-year-old girl in Texas who needed a kidney transplant was removed from the transplant list because she had not received the COVID-19 vaccine. Despite being medically fragile, this child and her family are being forced to choose between risking her life with an EUA experimental vaccine and being barred from receiving a life-saving transplant. This violates Defendants’ assurance in its published fact sheet for this vaccine that if parents choose not to vaccinate their child, “it will not change your child’s standard medical care.”39 This is the kind of horrific discrimination that Texas children currently face if this illicit EUA is not stayed. And such discrimination will likely only grow worse without judicial action.
Plaintiffs fear their children will experience pressure and coercion to receive the vaccine to participate in society, attend school, or have access to basic medical needs. Plaintiffs are concerned that Texas schools and municipalities may follow other states and implement discriminatory vaccine mandates as a prerequisite for school attendance or activity participation. Although Gov. Abbot has signed an executive order prohibiting COVID-19 vaccine mandates, current policies such as those at Texas hospitals exist which could certainly lead to serious physical harm or death of unvaccinated individuals, and raises concern that such an executive order is insufficient to prevent legitimate harm from befalling Plaintiffs’ children.
Should this trend continue, this EUA is likely to cause mental and physical harm not only to the children who receive the biologic and suffer an adverse effect, but also to those who refrain and are subject to egregious discrimination based on the completion of an ineffectual, unnecessary, and potentially dangerous medical procedure. Legal limits on the FDA’s power continue to be eviscerated using the “emergency” exceptions intended for actual emergencies, and their misappropriation and misuse by the FDA, along with the mislabeling and misadvertising of this drug disguised as a “vaccine,” pose real risks to Plaintiffs’ minor children.
See attached, with lots of medical information enclosed. Feel free to copy-and-paste, highlight, or use as you see fit, or is beneficial for you.
Motion_to_Stay_eFiled_4.15.22.pdf
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE, )
DEBORAH L. ELSE, an individual, and )
SACHA DIETRICH, an individual, ) )
Plaintiffs, ) )
v. ) )
FOOD and DRUG ADMINISTRATION, and )
JANET WOODCOCK, Acting Commissioner )
of Food and Drug Administration, ) )
Defendants. )
________________________________________ )
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY THE FOOD &
DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF THE
PFIZER-BIONTECH COVID-19 BIOLOGIC FOR CHILDREN AGES FIVE THROUGH ELEVEN
DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF THE
PFIZER-BIONTECH COVID-19 BIOLOGIC FOR CHILDREN AGES FIVE THROUGH ELEVEN
The FDA authorizes pharmaceutical companies to experiment on children without their consent. FDA’s EUA greenlights mandates of this experimental biologic on children to the enormous profit of the pharmaceutical companies, while simultaneously immunizing these same drug companies against any liability for any injuries their products cause.
With the granting of EUA status of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine for children as young as five years old, the FDA is conducting a dangerous and unprecedented experiment. Using its emergency powers, FDA authorized an experimental biologic for children, even though no COVID-19 health emergency exists for five year old children. This drug is neither safe nor effective and does not fit the traditional definition of “vaccine,” as was represented via this authorization. Despite knowledge that authorization would result in mandatory use without informed consent, Defendants engaged in neither the requisite scientific or citizen discourse, ignored citizen and scientific petitions alike, and skipped any notice-andcomment process altogether. The FDA misused its emergency powers to authorize an experimental mRNA vaccine for minor children despite serious safety concerns, inadequate testing, and outright misrepresentation of the biologic.
The FDA’s action poses irreparable and immediate injury to plaintiffs and places plaintiffs' minor children at imminent risk of harm. The FDA unlawfully and injuriously mischaracterizes any purported legal source of their power, falsely represents this body-altering experimental mRNA gene therapy to be injected into children, and impermissibly redefines the word “vaccine” itself. CHD as an institution suffers and its essential resources are diverted to address this danger. The FDA claims to be above the law, the citizenry, and even this court. This suit follows, and, due to the urgent threat posed, this motion made necessary thereby.
FACTS
I. COVID-19 poses no emergency for children ages five through eleven
Defendants abused their authority under the emergency use authorization statute when it granted the EUA at issue because no “actual or potential emergency” exists for children ages five through eleven from COVID-19. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–3(a)(1).
Data on the risks posed from COVID-19 show that it is entirely unnecessary for children in this age group to be vaccinated. Death from COVID-19 in healthy children is statistically zero. A German study concluded that “children without comorbidities were found to be significantly less likely to suffer from a severe or fatal disease course,” with the lowest risk observed in healthy children aged five through eleven. 1 Within this group, the “ICU admission rate was 0.2 per 10,000 and case fatality could not be calculated, due to an absence of cases.”2 Similarly, a Johns Hopkins study monitoring 48,000 children diagnosed with COVID “found a mortality rate of zero among children without a pre-existing medical condition,”3 while a study published in Nature Medicine showed that children under 18 with no comorbidities have virtually no risk of death from COVID-19.4 Children also have low risk of severe symptoms and hospitalization, with COVID-19 “hospitalizations occurred at a rate of 10.8 per 100,000 children,” 5 and infected children often experience mild or asymptomatic disease. 6 Furthermore, epidemiological studies suggest that children do not significantly contribute to the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and that younger children may be less likely to transmit the virus. 7
The calculated risk from COVID-19 is realistically even lower, as this “emergency” was based on inaccurate death statistics. The CDC recently corrected its COVID-19 mortality data for children, which was “inflated” in a “coding logic error” in which non-COVID-19 related deaths were counted in the statistics reduced the total pediatric deaths from COVID-19 by nearly 24% (1,755 individuals to 1,356). 8 315 of those occurred in children ages five through eleven; this is equivalent to under 200 children per year in a population of approximately 28 million children aged five through eleven, which is under a 0.00000714 risk of death. Acknowledging this data, Florida became the first U.S. state to recommend against healthy children receiving this biologic, publishing guidance on March 8, 2022 that “healthy children from ages 5 to 17 may not benefit from receiving the currently available COVID-19 vaccine.”9
II. The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 “vaccine” confers no benefit to children
This biologic has proven to be monumentally less successful than the originally promised 90% effectiveness claimed by Pfizer-BioNTech. A comprehensive study of over 365,000 children ages five through eleven revealed that that biologic has an effectiveness of a mere 12%. 10 A study of hundreds of thousands of children in New York revealed that the COVID-19 vaccines offered “virtually no protection against infection, even within a month after full immunization.”11 What’s more, a Danish study found no statistically significant positive effect against Omicron infection was seen 30 days after vaccination, and after 90 days, it conferred a negative effectiveness, i.e. greater susceptibility to infection. 12 This trend is seen worldwide, with highly vaccinated populations demonstrating a higher COVID-19 infection rate.
The CDC excludes COVID-19 on their published list of “vaccine-preventable diseases” for a clear reason: this COVID-19 biologic fails to prevent COVID-19. At best, it reduces the incidence of hospitalization and death, of which children are at an incredibly low risk. As COVID-19 poses an infinitesimal risk to children ages five through eleven, and none to healthy children, and vaccination is ineffective at preventing infection or transmission, there is no medical necessity, or even justification, for pediatric COVID-19 vaccination.
[clip]
V. The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 biologic drug fails to meet the traditional definition of “vaccine”
The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 biologic does not fall under the traditional definition of “vaccine” and has thus been continuously misrepresented by Defendants, and ultimately the pharmaceutical companies, media, and American government. Pfizer-BioNTech’s experimental mRNA biologic is among the first of its kind, utilizing a brand-new delivery system and gene therapy technology. Unlike vaccines that have come before it, this biologic does not actually contain the virus, SARS-CoV-2, that causes the COVID-19 disease, but rather delivers mRNA sequences that infiltrate the body’s cells and yield the production of a spike protein that mimics the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. The mRNA component injected into the body utilizes the host cell’s own machinery to produce the spike protein. This is a different mechanism than that of traditional vaccines, such as inactivated, attenuated, subunit, or protein-based vaccines that do not penetrate human cells but utilize the actual virus to activate the body’s immune response
While not a “vaccine” under the traditional definition, this experimental injection does fall under the FDA Office of Cellular, Tissue, and Gene Therapies’ definition of “gene therapy products,” although the FDA failed to study and test it as such. Gene therapies have never been widely used in a general population and using them in this manner is still experimental.
VI. Defendants’ EUA absent a stay will result in discriminatory treatment towards unvaccinated children
The history of the FDA and its role in regulating medical products has led the public to trust the FDA’s actions without question. The very fact that the FDA authorized this product, instilled faith in its use and misled confidence in an experimental vaccine. Cultural and societal shifts that directly affect children have and will continue to occur as a result.
Defendants’ unlawful EUA has already triggered mandates and policies that segregate and endanger vaccinated and unvaccinated children. New Orleans became the first major school district in the United States to mandate that all children ages five and up receive a COVID-19 experimental injection.32 Furthermore, a bill proposed in California, SB 871, would require all children to receive a COVID-19 injection to attend childcare For school.33
Before the 5-11 EUA was even granted, there were calls from a Texas State Board of Education member to immediately add the COVID-19 vaccine to the list of public-school mandatory immunizations.34 In his request letter to the Department of State Health Services, he argued that this step should be taken “[n]ow that the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine has received full FDA approval.”35 The vaccine available under the 5-11 EUA is not the same as Pfizer’s licensed Comirnaty, which, according to the CDC, is not yet available to the public.36 This is an example of how school officials have been misled by FDA’s bait-and-switch as well as the eagerness to mandate this biologic for young children.
Even more alarming are reports of hospitals refusing to perform organ transplants for patients who have not received a COVID-19 vaccine.37 The Cleveland Clinic, the University of Colorado Hospital, and Brigham and Women’s Hospital have all engaged in this type of abhorrent discrimination. Just recently, a North Texas teenager was denied a kidney transplant due to his vaccination status.38 This discriminatory treatment has shockingly even applied to young children. In December 2021, a five-year-old girl in Texas who needed a kidney transplant was removed from the transplant list because she had not received the COVID-19 vaccine. Despite being medically fragile, this child and her family are being forced to choose between risking her life with an EUA experimental vaccine and being barred from receiving a life-saving transplant. This violates Defendants’ assurance in its published fact sheet for this vaccine that if parents choose not to vaccinate their child, “it will not change your child’s standard medical care.”39 This is the kind of horrific discrimination that Texas children currently face if this illicit EUA is not stayed. And such discrimination will likely only grow worse without judicial action.
Plaintiffs fear their children will experience pressure and coercion to receive the vaccine to participate in society, attend school, or have access to basic medical needs. Plaintiffs are concerned that Texas schools and municipalities may follow other states and implement discriminatory vaccine mandates as a prerequisite for school attendance or activity participation. Although Gov. Abbot has signed an executive order prohibiting COVID-19 vaccine mandates, current policies such as those at Texas hospitals exist which could certainly lead to serious physical harm or death of unvaccinated individuals, and raises concern that such an executive order is insufficient to prevent legitimate harm from befalling Plaintiffs’ children.
Should this trend continue, this EUA is likely to cause mental and physical harm not only to the children who receive the biologic and suffer an adverse effect, but also to those who refrain and are subject to egregious discrimination based on the completion of an ineffectual, unnecessary, and potentially dangerous medical procedure. Legal limits on the FDA’s power continue to be eviscerated using the “emergency” exceptions intended for actual emergencies, and their misappropriation and misuse by the FDA, along with the mislabeling and misadvertising of this drug disguised as a “vaccine,” pose real risks to Plaintiffs’ minor children.
Suit Challenging Vaccine Mandate for Transplants
Highlighted, as customary.
Campau_Final_Complaint_5-13-22.pdf
JENNA CAMPAU, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF MINOR CHILD A.C., CASE NO. Plaintiff,
v.
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS D/B/A HELEN DEVOS CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, BHSH SYSTEM, Defendants,
COMPLAINT
1. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of her minor daughter who is need of a kidney transplant but is being excluded from the necessary medical evaluations and processes on account of the defendant medical providers’ vaccination policies. Those policies effectively require the Plaintiff to either violate her religious beliefs or deny her daughter life-saving medical care.
2. The Plaintiff is the mother of A.C. (formerly known as A.M.), a minor child. A.C. is seventeen years old. She brings this action as the parent and next friend of A.C. The Plaintiff and A.C. reside in Fennville, Allegan County, Michigan.
3. Defendant Spectrum Health Hospitals d/b/a Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital is a domestic non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of Michigan, with its headquarters and principal place of business in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan. This defendant is a licensed healthcare provider which owns and operates several hospitals and other medical facilities, including but not limited to the Helen DeVos Children's Hospital in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan.
4. Defendant BHSH System is a domestic non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of Michigan, with its headquarters and principal place of business in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan. This defendant is a system of hospitals, medical facilities and other medical providers, which owns and operates said hospitals, medical facilities and other medical providers, including the Helen DeVos Children's Hospital in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan.
14. The Plaintiff has attempted to initiate the transplant process for A.C. at the Hospital. 1
15. The United Network for Organ Sharing (hereinafter “UNOS”) is is the mission-driven non-profit serving as the nation’s transplant system under contract with the federal government. It manages the national transplant waiting list and matches donors to recipients.
16. The Hospital and defendants are members of UNOS and/or rely on UNOS for transplant organs for their patients.
17. UNOS does not as a system, have vaccine requirements for prospective organ recipients. UNOS’ Transplant Living website specifically states: “Each transplant hospital makes its own decisions about listing and transplanting candidates according to the hospital’s best clinical judgment, including whether or not any specific vaccination is part of their eligibility criteria.” https://transplantliving.org/covid/#PatientFAQ (Last accessed 4/22/2022).
18. The defendants have enacted their own policies to mandate vaccines for organ transplant patients.
19. In order to even start the transplant process, which includes preliminary evaluations, A.M. would be required, under Hospital policy, to receive several vaccines, including but not limited to those for COVID-19, influenza and H.P.V. (human papillomavirus), which it considers pre-transplant requirements.
20. The Plaintiff and her husband object to the requested vaccinations on religious grounds. Due to their religious beliefs, they are opposed to any vaccine or other medical product that is produced or researched using aborted fetal cells and also genetic modifications or therapies that involve combing human and cells or DNA. Additionally, they oppose, under the religious laws established in the Book of Leviticus, vaccines that contain products from various animals it lists as “unclean.”
21. The three COVID-19 vaccines available in the United States are produced using aborted fetal cells.
22. The Plaintiff has made her objections regarding the vaccines known to the Hospital and requested reasonable accommodations; that the transplant process commence without A.C. receiving the vaccines in question.
23. The requested vaccines are not medically necessary for the evaluation process to commence or for a kidney to be transplanted.
24. The Plaintiff informed the Hospital, through resident physician Sammy Dia, M.D., that she was opposed to vaccines on religious grounds and because of potential side effects, on or about August 20, 2021.
25. On or about September 17, 2021, Jason Thomas, M.D., a nephrologist at the Hospital, noted that A.C. would likely receive a referral for a kidney transplant in the following months. On or about October 15, 2021. Dr. Thomas discussed the requirements and recommendations for the transplant process, including required vaccines and medications. The Plaintiff again voiced her objections to the vaccines.
26. Thereafter, on or about October 30, 2021, the Plaintiff requested the Hospital’s written protocols concerning transplant vaccine and medical requirements. She and medical personnel continued to discuss the requirements and transplant process.
27. On or about January 18, 2022, during a care conference, Dr. Thomas informed the Plaintiff and her family that A.M. was medically ready to begin the pretransplant process.
28. On or about February 25, 2022, Hospital Social Worker Phoebe Bell told the Plaintiff that there may be exceptions to the Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements that would be considered on an individual basis.
29. On or about March 25, 2022, Rosemary Olivo, M.D., a physician with the Hospital, acknowledged that, in response to the Plaintiff’s questions, that if patients refused to receive vaccines in the transplant process, that the transplant team would meet and discuss the matter with the Hospital’s ethics department.
30. Although the Plaintiff has made repeated requests for exceptions to the pre-transplant vaccine requirements, as of the filing of this Complaint, the Hospital has not considered them.
31. On or about April 14, 2022, the Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the defendants’ general counsel requesting exemptions to the pre-transplant vaccine requirements and further requested a response by April 21, 2022. The defendants did not respond. A copy of that letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A.
32. On or about April 28, 2022, the Hospital contacted the Plaintiff to schedule a psychological evaluation, which is part of the transplant process, for A.C. The Plaintiff agreed to schedule the evaluation.
33. On or about April 28, 2022, the Hospital contacted the Plaintiff to schedule a Transplant Consent Education session. The Plaintiff agreed and attended the session on May 9, 2022. At that session, the Hospital provided to the Plaintiff a copy of a pamphlet titled “The Pediatric Kidney Transplant Process.”
34. In a section of the pamphlet, under the heading, “Reasons why your child may not qualify for a transplant (Exclusion criteria),” it lists “refusal of childhood vaccinations as recommended by infectious diseases.”
35. The pamphlet does not specify the COVID-19, influenza and HPV vaccines as required. Additionally, they are not reasonably considered childhood vaccines. The State of Michigan, for instance, does not require any of the aforementioned vaccines for school entry.
36. If A.C. does not receive a kidney transplant or if the transplant process is delayed, she will suffer adverse health consequences.
COUNT ONE – VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
37. Paragraphs 1-36 are incorporated by reference as though set forth in full.
38. Title II of the Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, provides in relevant part that “all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
39. The Hospital is a place of public accommodation. It provides medical services as well as dining to the public.
40. The Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements, which conflict with the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, constitute a denial on the ground of the Plaintiff’s religion of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the Hospital.
COUNT TWO – VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT-LARSEN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.
37. Paragraphs 1-36 are incorporated by reference as though set forth in full.
38. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, codified at M.C.L. § 37.2302 provides that a person shall not “deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status.” M.C.L. § 37.2302(a).
39. The Hospital is a place of public accommodation and/or a place of public service.
40. The Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements conflict with the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and therefore constitute a denial of the full and equal enjoyment of Hospital’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Hospital because of the Plaintiff’s religion.
Highlighted, as customary.
Campau_Final_Complaint_5-13-22.pdf
JENNA CAMPAU, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF MINOR CHILD A.C., CASE NO. Plaintiff,
v.
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS D/B/A HELEN DEVOS CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, BHSH SYSTEM, Defendants,
COMPLAINT
1. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of her minor daughter who is need of a kidney transplant but is being excluded from the necessary medical evaluations and processes on account of the defendant medical providers’ vaccination policies. Those policies effectively require the Plaintiff to either violate her religious beliefs or deny her daughter life-saving medical care.
2. The Plaintiff is the mother of A.C. (formerly known as A.M.), a minor child. A.C. is seventeen years old. She brings this action as the parent and next friend of A.C. The Plaintiff and A.C. reside in Fennville, Allegan County, Michigan.
3. Defendant Spectrum Health Hospitals d/b/a Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital is a domestic non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of Michigan, with its headquarters and principal place of business in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan. This defendant is a licensed healthcare provider which owns and operates several hospitals and other medical facilities, including but not limited to the Helen DeVos Children's Hospital in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan.
4. Defendant BHSH System is a domestic non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of Michigan, with its headquarters and principal place of business in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan. This defendant is a system of hospitals, medical facilities and other medical providers, which owns and operates said hospitals, medical facilities and other medical providers, including the Helen DeVos Children's Hospital in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan.
14. The Plaintiff has attempted to initiate the transplant process for A.C. at the Hospital. 1
15. The United Network for Organ Sharing (hereinafter “UNOS”) is is the mission-driven non-profit serving as the nation’s transplant system under contract with the federal government. It manages the national transplant waiting list and matches donors to recipients.
16. The Hospital and defendants are members of UNOS and/or rely on UNOS for transplant organs for their patients.
17. UNOS does not as a system, have vaccine requirements for prospective organ recipients. UNOS’ Transplant Living website specifically states: “Each transplant hospital makes its own decisions about listing and transplanting candidates according to the hospital’s best clinical judgment, including whether or not any specific vaccination is part of their eligibility criteria.” https://transplantliving.org/covid/#PatientFAQ (Last accessed 4/22/2022).
18. The defendants have enacted their own policies to mandate vaccines for organ transplant patients.
19. In order to even start the transplant process, which includes preliminary evaluations, A.M. would be required, under Hospital policy, to receive several vaccines, including but not limited to those for COVID-19, influenza and H.P.V. (human papillomavirus), which it considers pre-transplant requirements.
20. The Plaintiff and her husband object to the requested vaccinations on religious grounds. Due to their religious beliefs, they are opposed to any vaccine or other medical product that is produced or researched using aborted fetal cells and also genetic modifications or therapies that involve combing human and cells or DNA. Additionally, they oppose, under the religious laws established in the Book of Leviticus, vaccines that contain products from various animals it lists as “unclean.”
21. The three COVID-19 vaccines available in the United States are produced using aborted fetal cells.
22. The Plaintiff has made her objections regarding the vaccines known to the Hospital and requested reasonable accommodations; that the transplant process commence without A.C. receiving the vaccines in question.
23. The requested vaccines are not medically necessary for the evaluation process to commence or for a kidney to be transplanted.
24. The Plaintiff informed the Hospital, through resident physician Sammy Dia, M.D., that she was opposed to vaccines on religious grounds and because of potential side effects, on or about August 20, 2021.
25. On or about September 17, 2021, Jason Thomas, M.D., a nephrologist at the Hospital, noted that A.C. would likely receive a referral for a kidney transplant in the following months. On or about October 15, 2021. Dr. Thomas discussed the requirements and recommendations for the transplant process, including required vaccines and medications. The Plaintiff again voiced her objections to the vaccines.
26. Thereafter, on or about October 30, 2021, the Plaintiff requested the Hospital’s written protocols concerning transplant vaccine and medical requirements. She and medical personnel continued to discuss the requirements and transplant process.
27. On or about January 18, 2022, during a care conference, Dr. Thomas informed the Plaintiff and her family that A.M. was medically ready to begin the pretransplant process.
28. On or about February 25, 2022, Hospital Social Worker Phoebe Bell told the Plaintiff that there may be exceptions to the Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements that would be considered on an individual basis.
29. On or about March 25, 2022, Rosemary Olivo, M.D., a physician with the Hospital, acknowledged that, in response to the Plaintiff’s questions, that if patients refused to receive vaccines in the transplant process, that the transplant team would meet and discuss the matter with the Hospital’s ethics department.
30. Although the Plaintiff has made repeated requests for exceptions to the pre-transplant vaccine requirements, as of the filing of this Complaint, the Hospital has not considered them.
31. On or about April 14, 2022, the Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the defendants’ general counsel requesting exemptions to the pre-transplant vaccine requirements and further requested a response by April 21, 2022. The defendants did not respond. A copy of that letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A.
32. On or about April 28, 2022, the Hospital contacted the Plaintiff to schedule a psychological evaluation, which is part of the transplant process, for A.C. The Plaintiff agreed to schedule the evaluation.
33. On or about April 28, 2022, the Hospital contacted the Plaintiff to schedule a Transplant Consent Education session. The Plaintiff agreed and attended the session on May 9, 2022. At that session, the Hospital provided to the Plaintiff a copy of a pamphlet titled “The Pediatric Kidney Transplant Process.”
34. In a section of the pamphlet, under the heading, “Reasons why your child may not qualify for a transplant (Exclusion criteria),” it lists “refusal of childhood vaccinations as recommended by infectious diseases.”
35. The pamphlet does not specify the COVID-19, influenza and HPV vaccines as required. Additionally, they are not reasonably considered childhood vaccines. The State of Michigan, for instance, does not require any of the aforementioned vaccines for school entry.
36. If A.C. does not receive a kidney transplant or if the transplant process is delayed, she will suffer adverse health consequences.
COUNT ONE – VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
37. Paragraphs 1-36 are incorporated by reference as though set forth in full.
38. Title II of the Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, provides in relevant part that “all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
39. The Hospital is a place of public accommodation. It provides medical services as well as dining to the public.
40. The Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements, which conflict with the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, constitute a denial on the ground of the Plaintiff’s religion of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the Hospital.
COUNT TWO – VIOLATION OF THE ELLIOTT-LARSEN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.
37. Paragraphs 1-36 are incorporated by reference as though set forth in full.
38. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, codified at M.C.L. § 37.2302 provides that a person shall not “deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status.” M.C.L. § 37.2302(a).
39. The Hospital is a place of public accommodation and/or a place of public service.
40. The Hospital’s pre-transplant vaccine requirements conflict with the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and therefore constitute a denial of the full and equal enjoyment of Hospital’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Hospital because of the Plaintiff’s religion.
Vaccine Mandate That Led To Firing Of Three Barrington (RI) Teachers Lacked Necessary Public Notice, Court Rules
The three Barrington, Rhode Island, teachers who were fired for refusing the Covid vaccine on religious grounds scored an important early win in court yesterday when Associate Justice Jeffrey A. Lanphear of the Rhode Island Superior Court ruled that the Barrington School Committee failed to give the teachers—and the public—sufficient notice before enacting its Covid vaccine mandate.
As reported here last week, each of the three teachers—Brittany DiOrio, Stephanie Hines, and Kerri Thurber—had requested a religious exemption from taking the Barrington school district’s mandatory Covid vaccine. The district denied their requests, suspended them without pay, and ultimately fired them effective January 1st of this year. The school committee upheld that decision at a post-deprivation hearing held at the end of March, and the teachers plan an appeal.
But while the administrative appeals process seems likely to drag on for months, it is only one piece of the teachers’ legal battle. They have also asked the Rhode Island Superior Court to block the mandate, arguing that the school district violated Rhode Island’s Open Meetings Act, which requires notice of the school district’s public meetings, including “the nature of the business to be discussed.”
The school’s mandate took the teachers by surprise. They were due back in school by late August 2021, but it was not until September 21st that a letter came from Superintendent Michael Messore notifying them that they would have to vaccinate by November 1st or face termination. With the school year already underway, the teachers had no time to seek other options.
Judge’s Refreshing, Common Sense Ruling Rejecting New York City’s COVID Vax Mandate
Porzio noted that the city’s mandate for government employees was about compliance, not health and safety.
“If it was about safety and public health, no one would be exempt,” he explained.
The entire opinion is worth the read — even if only to remind you that you weren’t insane for opposing vaccine mandates — but the conclusion at the end is particularly enlightening.
For additional reporting, click here.
The full ruling can be read here and below:
During my talk at the Covid Summit this weekend, I reported that courts are now more receptive to arguments about the pandemic than they’ve ever been. Proving the point, in more terrific news yesterday, New York’s Richmond County Supreme Court ordered workers who’d been fired for being unjabbed to be reinstated — with back pay — explaining “Being vaccinated does not prevent an individual from contracting or transmitting Covid-19,” and adding that the mandates were really more about compliance than public health.First, the Court found that the City’s shot mandate was irrational, because employees were allowed to keeping working right up until they were terminated:
Then the Court observed what I’ve said from the beginning, that “emergencies” are by definition TEMPORARY and short-lived.
The Court noted what we all now know, that the mandates don’t make any sense because the shots don’t protect other workers; since they don’t prevent transmission of the virus.
Finally, the Court ground any remaining shreds of the mandate’s justification to dust, noting that the mandates have never made sense as an issue of “safety:”
Every time another decision like this comes down, the body of available case law grows. Every time another decision like this comes down, lawyers get more tools to use against the mandates. Every time another decision like this comes down, it gets easier to beat future mandates.
As I’ve said before, what we ultimately need is a new federal law canceling all vaccine liability protection, and putting vaccines on an equal footing with other drugs. If any drug — vaccine or not — injures someone, the manufacturer should compensate that person for their injury.
The original theory behind the vaccine liability shields was to encourage companies to make vaccines. It’s now time to have a conversation about whether the shields are still needed, about what ‘unanticipated’ problems have arisen, and about how vaccine injured people have been left twisting in the wind.
☕️ C&C NEWS ☙ Wednesday, October 26, 2022 ☙ DISPROPORTIONATE 🦠
Premier Smith slaps the WEF over bragging; New York Court slaps the City over mandates; Biden's 5th shot; Satanic drag brunch; no more UK trans procedures for kids; Fetterman; Griner; more.
www.coffeeandcovid.com
Military created prohibited digital tool to swiftly deny exemptions to its unlawful Covid-19 vaccine mandate
The Dossier has obtained the “digital tool” that at least one branch of the U.S. military has been using to mass-deny soldiers who apply for an exemption to the Pentagon’s unlawful Covid-19 injection mandate.
This system, known as the "Religious Accommodations Appeal Generator" (RAGG), has been used by the Coast Guard to strike down nearly 99% of exemption requests, utilized specifically to enforce the Pentagon’s unlawful mRNA mandate. The collective sorting computer tool was implemented despite the fact that federal laws and Pentagon policies require every religious exemption application to be treated on an individualized basis.
While the U.S. Coast Guard is supposed to be providing an “individualized look,” the system is being utilized to swiftly deny the prospect for exemptions from the mRNA drugs, which carry an increasing worrisome side effect profile. The Florida Department of Health recently released a study showing that the mRNA shots carry significant risks specifically for fighting age males.
Nonetheless, the Coast Guard has maintained a stunning a near 99% denial rate in response to exemption requests.
The RAGG is used to sort and then generate a blanket response to arguments against receiving the injections. This response would then appear in a dismissal letter “explaining” the exemption denial.
As shown below, the maritime security service sorted common arguments into certain categories. Some rejection worthy arguments (according to the Coast Guard) included:
“Risk of death is minimal. Only .03% death rate in DOD.”
“Risk of harm from the vaccine undermines readiness interest.”
“Vaccinated but unboosted members create similar risk from Omicron.”
Redacted: Pentagon denies exemptions to unlawful mRNA order, censors entire explanation
New docs confirm Pentagon unlawfully forced US service members to take unlicensed COVID shots
A new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document obtained by The Dossier proves without a doubt that the U.S. Department of Defense did not have FDA approved COVID-19 vaccines in its possession — despite top DOD officials claiming otherwise — while unlawfully forcing service members to take the shots, under the very real threat of separation, court martial, and other severe ramifications.
The Dossier has verified the authenticity of the FOIA document, which is published below. We’ve redacted personal information.
Replying to a question about the Defense Department’s possession of Pfizer’s Comirnaty, which in the context of the question can be understood as the FDA approved version of the COVID-19 vaccines, the Defense Logistics Agency responds:
“We began shipping Comirnaty labeled vaccine in June 2022. From the week of June 13, 2022, through the week of August 29, 2022, we will have shipped 9600 doses (160 boxes) of vaccine.”
They did not have anything with a Comirnaty label until June 2022. That’s almost a full year after the DOD vaccine mandate went into effect.
This is an admission that service members were injected exclusively with emergency use authorization products. Today, active duty troops continue to be harassed, threatened, and punished for non compliance with the unlawful order.
Sotomayor Lets NYC Vax Mandate for Public Workers Stand
One of Sotomayor’s jobs as one of the Supremes is to rule on emergency issues from New York. According to The Hill, it was in that capacity that she denied a request by some workers in the city’s public sector to block vaccines mandated by their employer. The group was made up of school teachers, law enforcement officers, sanitation workers, and an organization called New Yorkers for Religious Liberty. The group said that the mandate forces workers to choose between employment and violating their religious principles by taking the jab(s). It also alleges that the exemptions that are granted are done so on an arbitrary basis. Sotomayor even broke with protocol on Thursday by rejecting the request outright and eschewing the process of bringing the matter to the full court. In the past, the court has issued denials to similar requests for healthcare workers in Maine, public school teachers in NYC, and a cadre of students at Indiana University.
That Sotomayor would act unilaterally to help New York City enforce a mandate for a vaccine that has been outed as ineffective and has had its safety broadly scrutinized and questioned by people from all levels of society and all walks of life is no surprise. After all, as a wise man once said, people are entitled to all of the government they can pay for. Why a left-leaning justice would help keep the COVID fires burning is also no mystery. But what will remain a mystery is why New Yorkers continue to tolerate a government that insists they take a vaccine that provides the illusion of protection while denying them actual protection from “clear and present” dangers.
The Argument: A Reasoned Rant
vivabarneslaw.locals.com
- The FDA misled members of the public into believing that what they are receiving is a biologically licensed, fully vetted and completely approved vaccine, when such a product was not even available. But furthermore, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the FDA continuously misrepresented the biologic as a “safe,” “effective,” “vaccine,” when it is neither safe nor effective.
- Born amidst malaria and smallpox pandemics, the Constitution authorized no emergency exception to the liberties secured under it. The Founding Fathers understood the virus of concentrated power posed more of a threat than any biological virus ever could. The Nuremberg Code enshrines the right of informed consent as a matter of universal law, so widely recognized, courts consider it a jus cogens legal principle enforceable everywhere. Abdullah v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
- We only deviated from this Informed Consent standard of medical care during the Eugenics Era, a diseased doctrine birthed in the medical academies of the United States at the turn of the last century, a deformed outgrowth of the then in-vogue school of Social Darwinism. A trio of decisions carved out emergency exceptions to Constitutional liberties, including authorizing a fine for not taking a vaccine (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)), forced sterilizations of poor and politically unprotected populations (Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), (which relied exclusively on expanding Jacobson), and culminated in the kind of “emergency exception” logic that led a court to authorize forced detention camps of American citizens convicted of no crime (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). This trilogy of infamy sees its corpses rise again as “precedents” seemingly permitting governments to reinstate Eugenics-Era logic leap across the legal landscape.
- The concern over uninformed, nonconsensual and pharmacological failures haunts the history of rushed drugs, biologics and negligent courts. From Tuskegee to the military, from the foster homes of young women to the Indian health care services on reservations, from facilities for the mentally ill to jails for women, the least powerful and most trusting have been victimized by government medical experimentation, too often without recourse or remedy. Deceptive denial of syphilis treatment, forced sterilizations, testing of radioactive ingredients on unwitting patients, psychological experimentation on unsuspecting students (like the MK-Ultra type testing on Ted Kaczynski at Harvard), the LSD testing on government employees, the chemical testing over San Francisco or in New York City subways, the mustard gas secret tests on drafted soldiers – history teaches us that we cannot afford to carve out emergency or public health exceptions to Constitutional liberty. lest governments be authorized and approved to treat its citizenry as rats in a cage or guinea pigs for experimentation.
Barnes Brief: Thursday, December 15, 2022
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