Holy hell!!!

R

RadioPatrol

Guest
My Uncle is the CEO of Colt - I am going to send him an e-mail and tell him to hang out another year... the natives will be buying XD's like they are going out of style!



can we get a Corp Discount ...
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
Y'all...

...better read the decision before you get too happy.

There is PLENTY of room for restrictions within this thing.
 

Pete

Repete
...better read the decision before you get too happy.

There is PLENTY of room for restrictions within this thing.

True but there was one passage in the decision that made it sound like they frown on overly restrictive licensing requirements and want "shall issue" to be the rule. I wonder if the NRA is going to challenge Maryland's licensing now while the iron is hot?
 
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can we get a Corp Discount ...

I have tried! Short story - Maryland laws suck to the point where my Christmas present as an AR15... he could not transfer it from the manufacturer to me via an FFL. :bawl:

We are still trying to work out the details before he leaves! :yay:
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
Of note...

2.
Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed
weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to castdoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms byfelons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical traditionof prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56.

Hmm...
 

chernmax

NOT Politically Correct!!
Awesome news, now lets see how the Demorats in MD state government are going to twist sh!t to continue to ensure Maryland citizens cannot have the right to carry a firearm. Knowing that idiot O'Malley he'll start CCW license fees at 50g's.:coffee:
 
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R

RadioPatrol

Guest
Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Pp. 2–53.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists
feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and beararms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. Pp. 22–28.

(c)
The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28–30.
(d)
The Second Amendment’s drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30–32.

(e)
Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f)
None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation.
Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
2.
Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56.
3.

The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied toself-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on anentire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. :whistle:Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56–64.
478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.


:starcat:
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
Not good...

Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily
and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.

The right to license is hereby granted. If you qualify, you can keep and bear...


...in your home.
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
I'm in the process...

Awesome news, now lets see how the Demorats in MD state government are going to twist sh!t to continue to insure Maryland citizens cannot have the right to carry a firearm. Knowing that idiot O'Malley he'll start CCW license fees at 50g's.:coffee:

...of showing how they're gonna do it right now...

I'd hold up on the champagne if I were you.
 

chernmax

NOT Politically Correct!!
...of showing how they're gonna do it right now...

I'd hold up on the champagne if I were you.



Trust me it's staying on the shelf, MD is full of surprises. Still a significant victory and with this precedence, Maryland will be challenged!!!
 
R

RadioPatrol

Guest
:coffee:

The Second Amendment provides:

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, theright of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

In interpreting this text, we are guided by theprinciple that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation. The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today’s dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service. See Brief for Petitioners 11–12; post, at 1 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense with in the home. See Brief for Respondent 2–4. The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.” See J. Tiffany, A Treatise on Government and Constitutional Law §585,
p. 394 (1867); Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English
as Amici Curiae 3 (hereinafter Linguists’ Brief).Although this structure of the Second Amendment is unique in our Constitution, other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-rights provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement
of purpose. See generally Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 793, 814–821(1998).
Logic demands that there be a link between the statedpurpose and the command. The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it read, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right ofthe people to petition for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.” That requirement of logical connection maycause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause (“The separation of church and state being an important objective, the teachings of canons shallhave no place in our jurisprudence.” The preface makes clear that the operative clause refers not to canons of interpretation but to clergymen.) But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause. See F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 268–269 (P. Potter ed. 1871) (hereinafter Dwarris); T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation
and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 42–45 (2d ed. 1874).3 “‘It is nothing unusual in acts . . . for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedyoften extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first suggested the necessity of the law.’” J. Bishop,Commentaries on Written Laws and Their Interpretation§51, p. 49 (1882) (quoting Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 157, 165
(K.B. 1802)). Therefore, while we will begin our textual analysis with the operative clause, we will return to the prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.4

——————
3As Sutherland explains, the key 18th-century English case on the effect of preambles, Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wms. 314, 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (1716), stated that “the preamble could not be used to restrict the effect of the words of the purview.” J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction, 47.04 (N. Singer ed. 5th ed. 1992). This rule was modified in England in an 1826 case to give more importance to the preamble, but in America “the settled principle of law is that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.” Ibid.
JUSTICE STEVENS says that we violate the general rule that every clause in a statute must have effect. Post, at 8. But where the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as “whereas” clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution’s preamble,a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do. Or to put the point differently, operative provisions should be given effectas operative provisions, and prologues as prologues.​
 

Larry Gude

Strung Out
Another...

...reason I like Scalia;

In any event, the meaning of “bear arms” that petitioners
and JUSTICE STEVENS propose is not even the (sometimes)
idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a hybrid definition, whereby “bear arms” connotes the actual carrying of arms (and therefore is not really anidiom) but only in the service of an organized militia. No dictionary has ever adopted that definition, and we havebeen apprised of no source that indicates that it carriedthat meaning at the time of the founding. But it is easyto see why petitioners and the dissent are driven to the hybrid definition. Giving “bear Arms” its idiomatic meaning
would cause the protected right to consist of the rightto be a soldier or to wage war—an absurdity that no commentator has ever endorsed. See L. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 135 (1999). Worse still, the phrase“keep and bear Arms” would be incoherent. The word “Arms” would have two different meanings at once:“weapons” (as the object of “keep”) and (as the object of“bear”) one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying
“He filled and kicked the bucket” to mean “He filled the bucket and died.” Grotesque.

:lmao:
 
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