Pay $25 million to settle another fraud case?
Be Specific Where was Trump Guilty in that case
Testify against Bulgari in exchange for immunity in another tax fraud case?
:shrug: So What
Be Specific What Hookers did Trump Pay off - also explain how who a Private Citizen boinks is relevant
Foot the idea of gifting Putin a penthouse in a to be built Trump tower Moscow?
Be Specific show the emails or recorded conversations where Trump was involved in the Cohen - Sater discussion
Obstruct justice by firing James Comey?
Be Specific - How was Firing Comey Obstruction, Point to the Charges and Conviction
https://www.lawfareblog.com/was-firing-james-comey-obstruction-justice
However, the statutory bar is exceedingly high. Multiple circuit courts have concluded that under §§ 1503 and 1505, “although the defendant need not succeed in his attempt to obstruct justice, his conduct must be such ‘that its natural and probable effect would be the interference with the due administration of justice.’” This requires specific intent to obstruct or impede an investigation. In the context of any criminal proceeding, where the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, the possible existence of other motives would likely make obstruction of justice difficult to prove.
https://www.justsecurity.org/52977/muellers-uphill-battle-obstruction-law-comey-firing/
If no grand jury investigation involving the Flynn or Russia investigation was pending when Trump fired Comey, Aguilar suggests that a conviction under § 1503 would be difficult to sustain. In early April, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a series of subpoenas to associates of Trump’s former national security adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn. As of this writing, it is not known whether the president knew of the grand jury proceeding at this time, nor whether he discussed with Comey the workings of that proceeding. The president certainly wanted Comey to drop his investigation of Flynn, but it is not clear that the president’s interference was directed at the grand jury proceeding itself, which Aguilar seems to require. Like Aguilar, the president’s conduct seemingly was not directed at a covered proceeding at all, but rather was done with the “intent to influence some ancillary proceeding” or, in other words “an investigation independent of the court or grand jury’s authority” (here, the FBI investigation), which the Aguilar Court held was insufficient to sustain a conviction under § 1503.
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The second reading faces difficulties under Aguilar and Arthur Andersen, both of which suggest that the prospective proceeding must be foreseeable or contemplated, that the defendant’s conduct was intended to compromise that proceeding, and that the effects of the defendant’s conduct on the proceeding are not speculative. In Aguilar, merely making false statements to FBI agents even when a grand jury had already been empaneled did not constitute actionable obstruction under § 1503 because the effect on the prospective proceeding was speculative. By contrast, the Court noted, directly providing false statements to the grand jury would constitute obstruction because doing so “all but assured that the grand jury [would] consider the material in its deliberations.” If Aguilar’s essential teaching on the intent requirement extends to § 1512 prosecutions, the defendant must intend to affect the actual workings of the covered proceeding As of now, there is little evidence that the president knew of any grand jury proceeding and that the president intended the FBI under Comey to provide false information to, or otherwise tamper with, the grand jury – which the Aguilar Court held would be sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 1503. At worst, on our present understanding of the facts, the president intended to dissuade Comey, who was involved in a counterintelligence inquiry into Russian meddling in our elections, from continuing his investigation of Flynn, but there is no evidence he intended to interfere with any grand jury proceeding. Again, the president’s firing of Comey was a troubling act, and may become part of a showing of abuse of position making its way into a bill of impeachment, but (based on what we know) was not criminally culpable under the Court’s obstruction of justice jurisprudence.
It must be acknowledged that § 1512, like § 1503, contains sweeping language. The Court’s cases counsel that it is essential that statutes with such broad language be kept within their appropriate bounds, for, in “assessing the reach of federal criminal statute
,” courts must be sensitive to the “concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed” lest a broadly worded, ambiguous provision capture conduct that falls below the level of “culpability … we usually require in order to impose criminal liability.” In sum, whatever our feelings about the current president or his conduct in office, we must be cautious about expanding the scope of the obstruction statutes to avoid the risk they criminalize merely self-protective or inappropriate, but not criminal, conduct.