Actually, it is about Generals that think supporting ground forces is beneath them. Do away with the separate branches and just have a singular force structure (US Military) and get rid of about 2/3 of all these command officers.Well, we are talking about the Air Force.
Sorry Ken, I was just poking fun at the USAF. On the other hand, I believe you're onto something. The state of the world is precarious and I think a restructuring of our country's defenses are due for a change.Actually, it is about Generals that think supporting ground forces is beneath them. Do away with the separate branches and just have a singular force structure (US Military) and get rid of about 2/3 of all these command officers.
No need to apologize. As I posted a long time ago I think the Air Force is like a fan, stand in front of it, it blows. Stand behind it, it sucks. Stand beside it and it does nothing for you at all.Sorry Ken, I was just poking fun at the USAF. On the other hand, I believe you're onto something. The state of the world is precarious and I think a restructuring of our country's defenses are due for a change.
For a lot of rates a degree is almost a requirement and for senior ranks you can eliminate the almost. So really I see no reason to have the E/O separation.I said something about the military eliminating the enlisted/officer caste and you would have thought I took a dump on the baby Jesus
Personally I think the best thing to do with the entire A-10 fleet would be to transfer them to the Marines.What I have always heard;
The Air Force ' Fighter Mafia ' has NEVER liked the A-10 .... it has no flash like going Mach 2 in an F-16 or F-15
I think in the future the A-10 will be replaced by some sort of Drone ...
On May 27, 2003 the New York Times ran an op-ed by Robert Coram describing the Air Force’s plot to retire the A-10. Coram, author of the highly regarded Boyd: the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, revealed that in early April, Maj. General David Deptula of the Air Combat Command, ordered a subordinate to write a memo justifying the decommissioning of the A-10 fleet. Remember, this move came at one of the most perilous moments in the Iraq war, when the A-10 was proving its worthiness once again.
Why does the Air Force want to get rid of its most efficient plane? Coram says that the Air Force never liked the A-10 because it cut against the grain of the post-WW II Air Force mentality, which is fixated on high-altitude strategic bombing and the deployment of smart weapons fired at vast distances from the target. Indeed, the A-10 was rushed into development only because the Air Force feared that the Army’s new Cheyenne attack helicopter might cut the Air Force out of the ground support role, and hence much of the action (and money).
The A-10, built in the 1970s by Fairchild Industries, skims the ground at lower than 1,000 in altitude, can nearly hover over the battlefield, and spews out almost 4,000 rounds of armor-penetrating bullets per minute. (These are also the weapons coated with depleted uranium that have irradiated so much of Iraq and Afghanistan.) Pilots love the plane because it is easy to fly and safe: the cockpit is sealed in a titanium shell to protect the pilot from groundfire, it has a bulky but sturdy frame, three sets of back up controls and a foam-filled fuel tank.
Of course, the most damning factor against the A-10 in the eyes of the generals is the fact that it is old, ugly and cheap-especially cheap. The Air Force generals are infatuated with big ticket items, new technology and sleek new machines. The fastest way to a promotion inside the Air Force is to hitch your name to a rising new weapons system, the more expensive the better. When it comes time to retire, the generals who’ve spent their careers pumping new weapons systems are assured of landing lucrative new careers with defense contractors.
So each time the A-10 proves itself in battle, the cries for its extinction by Air Force generals become more intense and hysterical. Since the first Gulf War, where the A-10 outperformed every other aircraft even though the Stealth fighter got all the hype, the Air Force has been quietly mothballing the A-10 fleet. During the first Gulf War, the A-10s destroyed more than half of the 1,700 Iraqi tanks knocked out by air strikes. A-10s also took out about 300 armored personnel carriers and artillery sites. At the end of the war there were 18 A-10 squadrons. Now they’ve been winnowed down to only eight.